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ABSTRACT

FIXATION AND INCUBATION EFFECTS
IN PROBLEM SOLVING
by
MARIE T. HANSBERRY
University o f New Hampshire, December, 1998

In four experiments, the effects o f fixation and suppression processes in problem
solving ability were investigated. Previous research has shown that efficient suppression
mechanisms are integral to verbal ability (e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher,
Varner, & Faust, 1990; Hartman & Hasher, 1991). The present set o f experiments
demonstrated that such a mechanism is also a component o f problem solving ability. The
efficiency with which participants were able to suppress inappropriate meanings o f
ambiguous words was used as a measure o f suppression skill. Experiment 1 established
that participants who were able to make use o f previously-presented information to solve
difficult insight problems were also more efficient at suppressing the inappropriate word
meanings. Experiment 3 showed that participants who scored highly on the Remote
Associates Test (RAT) were better able to suppress the inappropriate meanings, in
comparison to low RAT solvers.
Experiments 1 - 4 investigated fixation effects. Experiment 1 demonstrated that
fixation to incorrect responses on the insight problems is not easily attenuated when these
incorrect responses have been generated by the subject. Experiment 2 showed that this
be
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fixation effect is not attenuated even with the inclusion o f an incubation period between a
first solution trial, in which the initial incorrect response is generated and a subsequent
trial, in which the same problems are again presented, along with clues to solution.
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that fixation can be attenuated when initial incorrect
solutions to RAT items are suggested by the experimenter. This is in contrast to
Experiments 1 and 2, in which initial incorrect responses were generated by the
participants. These attenuation effects were evidenced by increased solution rates to the
RATs after an incubation period.
These experiments also investigated the degree to which individuals o f varying
ability levels benefit from a period o f incubation. Previous research has shown mixed
results in this regard. The present findings are also inconclusive. Experiment 3 showed
that high-ability problem solvers benefited more from the incubation period than did lowability problem solvers, while Experiment 4 revealed no differences in the incubation
effects for individuals o f varying problem solving ability.

x

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INTRODUCTION

From the earliest days o f psychological research, investigators have speculated on
the processes o f thinking and problem solving. These early approaches were dominated
by two somewhat opposing approaches (see Newell & Simon, 1972 and Woodworth &
Schlosberg, 19S4 for reviews). One, articulated notably by Thorndike (1898) attributed
successful problem solving to a process o f trial and error, by which an animal or person
finds solution to a problem by eliminating potential incorrect responses. Thorndike (1901)
also concluded that while all o f the species that he tested used the same associative
processes, some species such as monkeys, formed associations much more quickly than
did the others. Altemativety, Kohler (192S) and other Gestalt psychologists alleged that
problems are solved suddenly, after a restructuring o f the problem has taken place. An
important distinction between the tw o theories is that solving problems by trial and error
necessarily depends upon past experience, while the insight approach emphasizes the
immediate circumstances, such as composition and organization o f the "problem field.”
Thorndike (1898) developed a number o f problems that embodied that concept o f
trial and error learning. According to the trial and error framework, an animal has
available to it a given set o f responses, and a variety o f circumstances will influence
response selection in any particular case. For example, when first placed in his "puzzle
box," Thorndike's cats tried many diffuse struggling responses, such as clawing, pulling,
and kicking in attempting to escape the box. Escape was possible when the animal came
1
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upon the necessary response. Importantly, Thorndike noted that the responses made by
the cats were not indiscriminant, but were similar to the types o f behaviors that had
previously resulted in escape from enclosed places. This is supported by his observation
that the cats did not emit every possible behavior, but rather confined their attention to the
slots and moving parts o f the box, which previously proved successful in similar situations.
Further, when Thorndike (1911) made escape from the puzzle box contingent upon nonstereotypical "escape" responses, such as licking, he found that the cats took far longer to
emit the correct response. He concluded that such responses were not transferred to the
puzzle box situation because they were not within the animal's repertoire o f likely escape
solutions.
Kohler (1925), working with chimpanzees and other apes, presented his subjects
with a series o f novel problems, one o f which was retrieving bananas that were outside o f
the reach o f a caged chimpanzee. Available to the chimp were two sticks, both o f which
were too short to reach the bananas. According to Kohler, the chimps initially tried to use
each stick to retrieve the bananas. When this approach proved unsuccessful, the chimps
stopped working on the problem for a period o f time before making the sudden
realization that the sticks could be pushed together to create a tool o f sufficient length to
accomplish the task. Kohler maintained that it was not simply the past history o f stick use
that triggered solutions, but rather a restructuring o f the problem that led to an immediate
solution.
Subsequent research, however, has proven, whatever the merits o f Kohler's
arguments about "insight," that prior experience plays an important role in problem
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solving. Birch (1945) showed that solutions to the Kohler problems were dependent upon
the past history o f the chimps. He presented the banana problem to chimps that were
raised in captivity and therefore had no past experience with using sticks as tools. Birch
found that none o f the chimps was able to solve the problem. However, all o f the chimps
solved the problem easily after they were provided with the opportunity to play with
similar sticks on several occasions. Birch concluded that past experience is a necessary
requisite to solving novel problems.
Recent research with humans draws similar conclusions (e.g., Weisberg, 1993;
Weisberg & Alba, 1981). There can be no doubt that prior experience plays a crucial role
in any account o f problem solving. Immediately antecedent experiences have been shown
to both facilitate solutions, in studies o f transfer (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983;
Maier, 1931) and hinder o r block solutions, in studies o f fixation (e.g., Duncker, 1945;
Luchins, 1942). And o f course, the participants in these experiments bring a long history
o f experience to the laboratory that can be summarized in so-called subject variables, such
as intelligence, age, flexibility o f thought, expertise, ability to suppress extraneous
information, and motivation. While these variables might be referred to as subject
variables, because they describe attributes that one brings to a problem solving situation,
researchers have also been interested in ways in which the problem solving situation can
be experimentally manipulated. For example, the mathematical problems used by Luchins
(1942) served to direct solvers to a particular rule for obtaining the desired quantities.
Other such manipulations have included varying instructions, presenting extraneous
information along with the problem to be solved, providing participants with clues to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

solving problems, and introducing varying time delays ("incubation" periods) between
successive solution attempts.
The research reported in this dissertation looks at human problem solving within
this broad trial and error framework. It should be noted that more modern conceptions o f
problem solving describe the process as a search through "problem space" (Newell &
Simon, 1972). The problem space includes the presented problem and the goal, as well as
the problem solver's knowledge. Thus, this conceptualization is functionally equivalent to
the trial and error terminology. The problems used are traditional ones o f a verbal nature
and presuppose that individuals do have the appropriate responses within their verbal
repertoire. They are among those that Newell and Simon (1972) called well-defined
problems, given that the parameters are clearly specified and there is a specific goal, or
solution, to each problem. The overall objective o f my project is to examine the
interrelationship o f several experimental manipulations, as well as certain subject variables,
on problem solutions. Details o f the factors relevant to this dissertation will be considered
in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER I

PROBLEM SOLVING

This chapter provides a review o f research relevant to the problems and
methodologies used in the present set o f experiments. These include conceptual transfer,
insight riddles, and the Remote Associates Test. Subsequent chapters outline the variables
that are used to predict success on these types o f problems.

Conceptual Transfer
Conceptual transfer involves the access o f relevant knowledge to solve problems.
A number o f investigations o f this issue have demonstrated that problem solvers fail to
spontaneously transfer available information to new situations (e.g., Gick & Holyoak,
1980; Needham & Begg, 1991; Perfetto, Bransford & Franks, 1983; Ross, Ryan, &
Tenpenny, 1989; Weisberg, DiCammilo, & Phillips, 1978). Many o f these studies have
used problems similar to those developed by German psychologist, Karl Duncker, who in
1945 demonstrated that solvers will proceed through a series o f steps when working out
the solutions to the difficult problems with which he presented them. Two o f his scenarios
have become classics in the problem solving literature.
The first is the candle problem, in which participants were presented with the task
o f finding a way to mount a candle to a wall, using only the candle, a box o f matches, and
some nails. He found that participants were generally unable to solve the problem, which
5
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involved dumping the matches from the box, nailing the box to the wall, and using the
matches to light the candle until there was enough wax to mount the candle in the box.
Duncker referred to the inability to solve this problem as "functional fixedness," or the
idea that we generally think o f only the customary use for a particular object, and
therefore, not the novel use that is necessary to solve this type o f problem. In this case
one must conceptualize using the box as a holder for the candle, rather than as a container
(CHucksberg & Weisberg, 1966).
The second o f Duncker's problems is the radiation problem. In this problem,
participants read a story that described a cancer procedure in which a tum or had to be
destroyed with radiation. The caveat was that the amount o f radiation passing through the
healthy tissue on the way to the tumor would destroy these cells as well. Participants
were asked to devise a way that the tumor could be destroyed, while leaving the
surrounding tissue unharmed. The correct solution was to attack the tum or with smaller
doses o f radiation, from a number o f points, thereby administering the required dosage to
destroy the cancer, while leaving the healthy tissue intact. Again, Duncker found that
participants were very unlikely to solve this problem.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) and Weisberg et al. (1978) revisited Duncker's problems,
and provided clues to solving them. Weisberg et al. presented the candle problem. Prior
to being faced with this problem, participants were given the task o f memorizing a series
o f paired associates. For experimental groups, one o f these pairs was, "candle-box."
Results showed that these participants were no more likely to solve the candle problem
than controls who memorized the pair, "candle-paper.” Only a second experimental
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group, who were given the hint that one o f the previously-memorized pairs would be
helpful to solution, were able to solve the problem. Weisberg et al. concluded that simply
possessing relevant information is not sufficient for effective solution, but that one must
also realize that the information is relevant.
Similarly, Gick and Holyoak (1980) administered the radiation problem. Before
being presented with this problem, participants read a similar problem in which a farmer
was faced with the dilemma o f providing a large amount o f water to his crops, without
creating erosion problems by having too much water going through his field via any one
pathway. The farmer had the idea o f providing several small irrigation systems to the
field, thereby sparing the flooding that would be caused over just one path. Surprisingly,
Gick and Holyoak's participants did not spontaneously use the information from the
farmer problem to solve the radiation problem, although the time between presentation of
the two problems was only several minutes. When they were instructed to use the farmer
information, nearly all o f the participants solved the problem.
Other research has shown that solvers will transfer, but again, only if they are
explicitly instructed to do so (e.g., Landrum, 1990; Perfetto et al., 1983; Ross et al., 1989;
Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein, Way, Benningfield, & Hedgecough, 1986; Weisberg et
al., 1978). Perfetto et al. presented a series o f statements about a specific protagonist or
object. An example is, NA man who lived in a small town in the U.S. married 20 different
women o f the same town. All are still living and he has never divorced any o f them. Yet,
he has broken no law. Can you explain?" In some conditions, the statements were
proceeded by a clue statement. In this example the clue was, "A minister marries several
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people each week." This statement was intended to provide participants with the
information necessary to solve the problem. These clue sentences were presented in the
initial part o f the experiment. As an orienting task, the participants were asked to judge
the sentences according to their truthfulness. In the subsequent problem solving phase,
participants in the informed group were told that the acquisition sentences would help
them to solve the problems, while the uninformed group was not given this hint.
Consistent with Gick and Holyoak's (1980) results, participants did not solve these
problems spontaneously. That is, they did not transfer the clue information to solve the
puzzle unless they were explicitly told to do so.

Fixation Effects in Transfer Paradigms
A secondary finding by Perfetto et al. (1983) was that participants who initially had
been uninformed o f the necessity to transfer the clue information to solve the puzzles were
often still unable to solve th e same problems on a second trial, when they were given these
instructions. However, they were able to use this clue information to solve puzzles
presented on this trial that they had not previously seen. In this procedure the participants
who had originally been in the uninformed group were retested. This time, they were
informed o f the relationship between the clue statements and the puzzles. They were
again presented with the original puzzles to solve, as well as some new puzzles that had
not been included in the first trial. The clue statement contained a relevant clue for each
o f these puzzles.
Perfetto et al. (1983) found that participants solved the new problems, but that
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they continued to experience difficulty in solving the problems that they had received in
the first trial. The authors concluded that participants were unable to solve the original
problems in the second session because they had previously generated their own responses
to these puzzles, which they continued to think were appropriate even after they were
informed o f the correct response. It should be mentioned that each o f the puzzles could
have one o r more plausible, though incorrect, solutions that were not the responses that
were supplied by the experimenter. For example, the minister puzzle might suggest the
conclusion that the man was a bigamist living in Utah, although this possibility was ruled
out in the puzzle. Further, the participants were informed that the clues supplied in the
first part o f the experiment were appropriate for solving the puzzles.
Perfetto et al. (1983) concluded that the participants encoded the wrong responses
on the first reading o f the puzzles, and retrieved these responses during the second
reading. This conclusion is supported by the finding that the participants did use the
supplied clues to solve the new puzzles in the second trial. Therefore, the clues were
available to participants, but the inability to make use o f them was limited to the riddles
for which incorrect responses had already been generated. This item-specific fixation has
been replicated in subsequent work with the same riddle materials (Adams, Kasserman,
Yearwood, Perfetto, Bransford, & Franks, 1988; Perfetto, Yearwood, Franks, &
Bransford, 1987).
In a follow-up study, Perfetto et al. (1987) tested their conclusion that the process
o f generating solutions to the riddles interfered with the access o f the relevant acquisition
sentence when solving on Trial 2. In this experiment, the "generate" group attempted to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
solve the riddles on Trial 1, while the "read" simply read the riddles, which were
accompanied by the solutions o f a yoked participant in the generate condition. Both
groups attempted to use the acquisition sentences to solve the riddles on Trial 2. Results
showed that generate group solved relatively fewer o f the "old” riddles on Trial 2 than did
the read group. This supports Perfetto et al.'s (1983) earlier theory that Trial 1 solution
attempts interfered with accessing o f the acquisition sentences for "old" riddles on Trial 2.
Other researchers (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990) have
made similar claims. For example, Ross & Kennedy forwarded a theory o f "reminding"
that is specific to problem solving. This theory states that we solve problems through a
process o f reminding, by which we automatically access previous information that shares
features with the problem to be solved. With regard to Perfetto et al.'s (1983) findings, it
is possible that when participants attempt to solve the same riddles on Trial 2, they are
reminded o f their first solution attempt, which includes their original incorrect responses.
Therefore, these incorrect responses block the access to the appropriate clue information.
While much literature has focused on a general lack o f spontaneous transfer, other
research has shown evidence for transfer in some participants. The following section
entails a discussion o f studies that have identified certain attributes o f problem solvers who
are able to successfully transfer relevant information when faced with a novel problem.

Spontaneous Transfer and Problem Solving Ability
The previous section outlined several studies demonstrating that simply possessing
necessary information is not sufficient to facilitate problem solving, but that participants
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must also recognize that this information is relevant to the problem (Perfetto et al., 1983;
Stein et al., 1986). These studies have shown that participants are very unlikely to
spontaneously access the relevant information. However, there has been little research to
investigate the characteristics o f the small number o f solvers who do exhibit spontaneous
transfer (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Lockhart, Lamon, & Gick, 1988; Novick, 1988;
Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein et al., 1986).
Gick and Holyoak (1983) presented two stories that were very similar in structure
to the radiation problem. Participants first read each story and summarized it. They were
then asked to describe how the two stories shared similarities. Participants were then
presorted with the radiation problem. As in the other studies o f transfer, some
participants were instructed that the previously-presented stories would aid in solving the
radiation problem, while others were not informed o f this relationship. Results showed
that the informed group had higher solution rates than uninformed group. However,
within both groups there was a relationship between the quality of the description o f
similarity between the two initial problems and the likelihood o f solving the radiation
problem. For example, in the uninformed group, 90% o f the participants who provided a
high-quality similarity description produced a solution to the radiation problem. A highquality description was one that described ways in which the two problems shared
structural similarities. These included a goal o f a large quantity o f something reaching a
particular central location, the limitation that all o f the force could not be delivered along
the same route, and a solution that involved breaking the total force into smaller quantities
that met at the desired location. This was referred to as the convergence solution.
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Gick and Holyoak (1983) concluded that one aspect o f being a good problem
solver is the ability to "see" the structural similarities between analogous problems.
Subsequently, Holyoak and colleagues (e.g., Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989)
have formulated the pragmatic schema model o f analogical transfer, which states that
successful problem solvers develop an abstract schema for working out problems o f a
similar nature. In the case o f the Gick and Holyoak results, individuals who developed an
appropriate schema for comparing the two example problems were able to utilize that
schematic information and appropriately transfer it to solve the radiation problem. This
"appropriate schema” involved recognizing the underlying structural similarities between
the tw o examples. In contrast, poor problem solvers, those who did not spontaneously
transfer solution to the radiation problem, focused on the surface similarities between the
two example problems.
Other researchers (e.g., Chen, 1995; Chen, Yanowitz, & Daehler, 1995; Chi,
Fehovich, & Glaser, 1981; Novick, 1988) have forwarded similar theories that apply to
various domains o f problem solving. These theories share the basic supposition that
expert problem solvers focus on structural similarities between analogous problems in
various domains, while novice problem solvers focus on surface similarities. For example,
Chi et al. showed this effect in physics experts and novices.

Accessing Remote Associates in Problem Solving
Another common task that has been used to measure problem solving performance
is the Remote Associates Test (RAT), which involves a series o f items, each made up o f
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three words that are related to each other in some way. The task is to determine the
common bond between the three words. An example is this: SNOW, DOWN, OUT. This
would require a response o f "fall", since each test word goes with "fell," (i.e., snowfall,
downfall, fell out). The solution to each o f these items is a word that has only a weak
connection to each o f the three words; that is, the solution is remotely associated to each
o f the words. Therefore, in order to solve each item, it is necessary to look beyond the
dominant meaning o f each o f the three words, and focus on the less-dominant meaning
that is somehow remotely associated to the other words via its connection to a fourth
word.
Mednick (1962) devised the RAT as a measure o f creativity. He believed that
people who are able to make these remote associates should also be more creative in
general because, according to Mednick's conceptualization o f creativity, a creative process
is one that makes use o f novel solutions to situations. While the RAT was conceptualized
by Mednick as a measure o f creativity, its usefulness as a predictor o f this ability has been
limited (Andrews, 1975; see Nickerson, 1985 for a review). However, the RAT has
proven to be a reliable indicator o f verbal ability (Katz, 1983), making it suitable for use
as a measure o f verbal problem solving.
Simonton (1988) forwarded a theory o f creative problem solving that is modeled
after Mednick's work. This theory states that original ideas result from the random
combination o f remotely-associated ideas. In Simonton's view, successful problem solvers
possesses a "looser" set o f connections between concepts than do less creative people and
are therefore less rigidly bound to systematic associations. Simonton hypothesized that
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this flexibility o f thought allowed such a problem solver to access the necessary solution to
the RAT because it is possible to look beyond the dominant meanings o f the words
comprising the RAT items.
From the above discussion, it is possible to draw a connection between ability on
the RAT and performance on the riddles that were described previously. In both cases, it
is necessary for the solver to "look beyond" the dominant meanings o f concepts and make
use o f the less obvious meanings to solve the problem at hand. For example, in order to
solve the "minister" problem, one must look ignore the dominant meaning o f "marry," that
is, to be wed, and instead access the less common meaning, to perform a marriage
ceremony. Similarly, to solve a RAT item, it is necessary to attend to the less common
meaning o f the three RAT words. The current set o f experiments includes an attempt to
relate the skill to solve RAT items to the ability to solve the previously-described riddles.
It is expected that these abilities are positively correlated.
In general, researchers have claimed that good problem solvers, and more
specifically, successful transfers, possess specific skills, such as the ability to recognize
structural similarities between similar types o f problems, and the ability for non-rigid
thinking. The current dissertation includes an investigation o f another characteristic o f
participants who possess high problem solving ability. This trait, the ability to suppress
extraneous information, is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II

INTERFERENCE AND SUPPRESSION

This section will provide an overview o f the literature and theories regarding the
role o f suppression efficiency in comprehension skill. Previous researchers have shown
that suppression ability is integral to certain cognitive skills, such as verbal comprehension.
The present dissertation extends this work to investigate the impact o f suppression skill on
problem solving ability.

The Stroop Task
Much o f the research on interference effects in cognitive processes stems from the
early work o f J. R. Stroop (1935), who demonstrated that the time necessary to name the
colors o f words could be affected by the meanings o f the words. Stroop required
participants to quickly name the ink color in which w ords were printed. The words
themselves were color names (e.g., the word, "red" printed in green ink). Stroop found
that reading times were longer if the words and the ink colors were incompatible. He
concluded that participants experienced interference from the word meanings when trying
to name the ink colors.
Performance on Stroop-like tasks has long been used as a measure o f reading
ability in children (e.g., Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Merrill, Sperber, & McCauley,
1981; Rosinski, Golinkoflf & Kukish, 1975). These studies have demonstrated that
15
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children suffer the greatest interference on this task just after they have learned to read.
Performance then improves and stabilizes in early adulthood. A decrease in performance,
that is, an increase in the interference effect on the Stroop task, is evidenced in late
adulthood (Hasher, Stoitzfus, Zacks, & Rympa, 1991; McDowd & Oseas-Kreger, 1991).

Negative Priming
In 1966, Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr provided an interesting extension o f the
Stroop Effect. Participants were presented with the Stroop Task, as described above.
However, in this experiment, each word was the name o f the following color on the list.
For example, BLUE printed in yellow ink was followed by RED printed in blue ink, then
GREEN printed in red ink, etc. In this way, participants had to name the ink color for the
word that they had ignored on the previous trial. Results showed that the time necessary
to name the ink colors on this task was even slower than on the standard Stroop Task.
Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr concluded that participants had to suppress the name o f
each word in order to name the ink color. Therefore, when the just-suppressed word had
to be activated to name the following ink color, the response times were longer, in
comparison to trials when the ink color was unrelated to the previous word.
Tipper (1985) originated the term, "negative priming," to describe this effect. He
defined negative priming as the increase in response time as a result o f a prior presentation
o f the target, compared to a condition in which the target had not previously been
presented and ignored. This can be compared to priming, in which response times to justattended stimuli are facilitated. Tipper and colleagues (e.g., Tipper, 1985; Tipper &
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Cranston, 1985) provided evidence for this effect in a series o f experiments.
Tipper and Cranston (1985) presented participants with a series o f superimposed
letters. One set o f the letters was printed in red ink and the other set was printed in green
ink. The required task was to read the red letters out loud while ignoring the green letters.
The measurement o f interest was the time necessary to read a control condition in which
only the red target letters were presented, versus the time taken to read the ignored prime
condition, which consisted o f target letters that had been presented as distractors on the
previous trial. That is, the red letters on this trial were the green letters on the previous
trial. If participants were successful inhibitors, then they would experience difficulty
naming the targets on the ignored prime condition. Results supported these predictions.
Subsequently, researchers have shown negative priming effects in many other
selective-attention tasks, such as picture naming (Tipper, 1985), semantic categorization
(Tipper & Driver, 1988), and counting (Driver & Tipper, 1989). Researchers have also
used the Tipper task to investigate the role o f inhibition skills in older adults' diminished
abilities in divided attention tasks (e.g., McDowd & Oseas-Kreger, 1991). These
researchers demonstrated negative priming in younger adults, but a lack o f negative
priming in the older adults. These results are taken as evidence for the Inhibition
Hypothesis forwarded by Hasher and Zacks (1988), which states that older adults suffer a
loss o f inhibition abilities, and that this loss is the basis for older adults' diminished
performance in selective attention tasks. Gernsbacher and colleagues (e.g., Gernsbacher,
1990; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991: Gernsbacher, Varner, & Faust, 1990) have formalized
a theory o f comprehension that builds upon this work on interference. This work is
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discussed in detail below.

Suppression and the Structure Building Framework
In a series o f experiments, Gernsbacher and colleagues (Gernsbacher et al., 1990;
Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991) demonstrated that low-skilled readers perform at lower levels
than high-skilled readers in a number o f cognitive tests. These tasks included the ability to
suppress information that was initially accessed during comprehension, but that was
subsequently shown to be unrelated to the context o f the material. Reading skill was
measured by the Multi-Media Comprehension Battery (Gernsbacher & Varner, 1988).
This battery consists o f six stories, two o f which are presented in written form, two in
spoken form, and two in the form o f nonverbal pictures. After reading each story, the
participants were asked twelve questions about the story. Gernsbacher and Varner found
that comprehension scores on the written and oral sections were highly correlated with
comprehension o f the nonverbal stories. Therefore, they have concluded that these skills
may be grouped together into what they called a "general comprehension skill." Based on
their overall findings, the researchers concluded that general comprehension skill includes
the ability to comprehend both linguistic and nonlinguistic information.
Additionally, Gernsbacher et al. (1990) devised a theory o f memory that they
termed the Structure Building Framework. According to this framework, there are several
processes involved in the construction o f mental representations that are necessary for
comprehension. During comprehension, memory nodes are activated by incoming
information. Once activated, these memory nodes will further transmit information
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concerning the processing o f the information. Two mechanisms in this system,
enhancement and suppression, control the activation level o f the memory cells. When the
information transmitted by the memory nodes is relevant to the structure that is currently
being built, enhancement serves to increase the level o f activation o f those nodes.
Analogously, when the information is not useful for the structure, the suppression
mechanism serves to decrease the activation level o f those nodes. Further, Gernsbacher et
al. claim that enhancement and suppression are not limited to language production, but
that they are general cognitive mechanisms that are involved in the structure building o f
nonlinguistic tasks as well.
These researchers provided evidence for such a framework. For example,
Gernsbacher et al. (1990) showed that low-skilled readers demonstrated a deficient ability
to suppress the inappropriate meaning o f ambiguous words. High- and low-skilled readers
were presented with sentences that ended with ambiguous words. An example o f such a
sentence is as follows: "He dug with the spade" (or, "He dug with the shovel"). In the
first sentence, "spade” is ambiguous because it might refer to either a garden tool or to a
playing card. After reading each sentence, a test word was presented. In this example,
the test word was "ACE." The task was to decide whether or not the test word fit the
meaning o f the sentence. The test word was presented at two intervals, either immediately
(100 ms) after the presentation o f the sentence, or 850 ms after the sentence. At the 100
ms interval, both high- and low-skilled readers had equal difficulty rejecting the test word
that corresponded to the inappropriate meaning o f the target word, suggesting that both
groups o f readers accessed both the context-appropriate meaning, as well as the
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context-inappropriate meaning. However, at the 850 ms interval, only the low-skilled
readers demonstrated this difficulty. Based on these findings, Gernsbacher et al.
concluded that low-skilled readers are less able to suppress the inappropriate meanings o f
ambiguous words.
Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) extended these findings to other tasks, both
linguistic and nonlinguistic. For example, in a linguistic task, they showed that low-skilled
readers are less efficient at suppressing the inappropriate forms o f homophones. The
procedure was similar to that used by Gernsbacher et al. (1990). Readers were presented
with sentences that ended with a word that was a homophone. For example, they read
"He had lots o f patients." The test word, "CALM" was not related to this word, but it
was related to the other member o f the homophone pair, "patience," which was never
actually presented. Gernsbacher and Faust compared response times to reject test words
from these sentences, versus the time to reject the word after reading control sentences
with non-homophone final words, (e.g., "He had lots o f students"). The difference
between these two decision times showed the amount o f activation for the incorrect form
o f the homophone. Again, the results showed that both the high- and low-skilled readers
had high activation o f the incorrect homophone after 100 ms, but only low-skilled readers
showed continued activation after a one-second interval.
O f particular importance to the proposed set o f experiments, Gernsbacher and
Faust (1991) have shown that suppression o f inappropriate schematic information is also a
critical aspect in comprehending nonlinguistic information. They based their research on
previous work that has shown that participants will access and use schematic information

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
when making judgments about objects in a scene that depicts a common venue, such as a
farm or an office (e.g., Biederman, Bickle, Teiteibaum, & Klatsky, 1988; Brewer &
Treyens, 1981). Biederman et al. presented participants with pictures o f objects that
might typically appear in a particular situation. One group o f objects included things that
might be found on a farm. Another group included common items that one might
encounter in a kitchen. Participants were then presented with a single picture o f an item.
The required task was to report whether or not the given object had appeared in the
original scene. Biederman et al. found that the participants were more likely to incorrectly
report that a item that is common to the original scene, but that had not been presented in
the scene, had actually been presented. For example, participants were more likely to
incorrectly report that a tractor had been presented in the farm scene than in the kitchen
scene.
Similarly, Brewer and Treyens (1981) found that participants recalled objects that
were consistent with their schema for a situation, even if the object had not been presented
to them. These researchers asked participants who arrived for their experiment to wait in
an office, supposedly waiting for the experiment to be set up in another room. After a
brief period, participants were taken to another room and asked to recall as many o f the
objects as they could that were in the office where they had been waiting. Brewer and
Treyens found that participants were most likely to remember the objects that were
consistent with their "office schema." That is, they remembered seeing the desk and chair,
but were less likely to recall the coffee pot or wine bottle. Also, many o f the participants
remembered having seen objects that had not been in the room, but that would be
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consistent with the schema for an office, such as books. Both Biederman et al. (1988) and
Brewer and Treyens interpreted their results as evidence for the activation o f a particular
schema when that schema is appropriate.
Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) have reanalyzed Biederman et al.'s (1988) results,
using a suppression paradigm. They reasoned that low-skilled readers should suppress the
distractor stimuli less efficiently than the high-skilled readers should, if the suppression
mechanism that controls linguistic information is the same mechanism that controls
nonlinguistic information. Gernsbacher and Faust conducted a partial replication o f the
Biederman et al. study, with th e addition o f a suppression measure. They measured the
time that participants took to reject the distractor items when these items were likely to be
found in the scenario (e.g., the time taken to reject "tractor" when it had not actually been
presented in a farm scene) versus the time necessary to reject the distractor item when it
was not common to the previously viewed scene (e.g., when the distractor item was
"tractor” and the scene had been a kitchen scene). The difference between these two
response times was the measure o f the activation o f the common distractor item.
Gernsbacher and Faust found that both high- and low-skilled readers demonstrated high
activation o f the common distractors when the test was given SO ms after the viewing o f
the scene. However, only the low-skilled readers showed continued activation one second
after viewing the scene. Gernsbacher and Faust concluded that the low-skilled readers
have less efficient mechanisms in place for these nonlinguistic tasks, as well as for the
linguistic tasks. Further, they concluded that a single mechanism underlies both o f the
task types.
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To summarize, Gernsbacher and colleagues have concluded that a general
cognitive mechanism is responsible for their varied findings. They suggested that this
general mechanism might underlie the deficits that the low-skilled readers have been
shown to display. The present set o f experiments will investigate the role that such a
mechanism might play in problem solving ability.
The impetus for extending Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990) research to problem solving
comes from three sources. The first is Gernsbacher et al.'s claim o f a general cognitive
mechanism, as described above. I f as the researchers claim, suppression efficiency is
integral to cognitive ability in general, then poor problem solvers should demonstrate
reduced suppression efficiency in comparison to more successful problem solvers. A
related source is research involving reading skills in children (e.g., Fowles & Glanz, 1976;
Merrill et al., 1981; Yuill & Oakhill, 1991), which is discussed below. The third source is
the literature on the relationship between problem solving skill and tendency for
conceptual transfer in problem solving (Novick, 1988; Stein et al., 1988). The first and
last o f these issues have already been addressed. The second source is the topic o f the
next section.

Developmental Research
As mentioned previously, performance on Stroop-like tasks has been used as a
measure o f reading ability in children (e.g., Comalli, et al., 1962; Merrill et al., 1981;
Rosinski & Golinkoff 1976). For example, Morrill et al. (1981) presented skilled and less
skilled fifth grade comprehenders with a modified Stroop task. This involved reading one
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sentence at a time and then naming the color o f a target word that appeared immediately
(one second) after the sentence was removed. The target word was appropriate,
inappropriate, or neutral with regard to the meaning o f the sentence. One set o f sentences
was:
Appropriate meaning: The man moved the piano.
Inappropriate meaning: The man played the piano.
Neutral: The girl watched the rain.

In this example, the target word was HEAVY. Results showed that skilled
readers exhibited interference in color naming when the target word was contextually
related to the sentence, compared to the time required to name the color o f the target
word when that word was inappropriate with regard to sentence meaning. In this
example, skilled readers responded more slowly to HEAVY when it followed, "The man
moved the piano," than when it followed, "The man played the piano." However, the less
skilled comprehenders did not show this pattern. These individuals exhibited interference
when the target word was related to the contextually inappropriate sentence. That is, the
naming times for the target word following the two semantically similar sentences did not
differ for the less skilled comprehenders. In contrast, the skilled comprehenders
responded as quickly to the target word when it was related to the contextually
inappropriate meaning o f the sentence as they did when the sentence was neutral with
regard to the target word.
Merrill et al. (1981) also measured color naming time latency following single
word contexts. In this procedure, participants read only the sentence final word (SFW)
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for each experimental sentence before naming the same target word. For example, they
read either the word, "piano," o r "rain," and then named the color o f the target word that
followed. Results for this single-word context showed a different pattern. Both the
skilled and less skilled comprehenders displayed interference from the related SFW,
compared to the neutral word.
Taken together, the results o f the sentence condition and the word condition
demonstrate that poor comprehenders process sentences differently than good
comprehenders. Specifically, it is suggested that poor comprehenders process sentences in
much the same way that they process single words, while good comprehenders form a
better representation o f the sentence meaning, which necessarily includes disregarding
word information that is not useful to maintaining the overall meaning o f the sentence.
Put another way, poor comprehenders do not make efficient use o f things such as context
in processing individual words in a sentence. Merrill et al. (1981) concluded that the poor
comprehenders are more bound to the surface features o f sentences, such as the exact
wording o f the sentences. Evidence for this claim lies in the finding that the poor
comprehenders processed the words similarly, regardless of whether the word was
presented in isolation or as part o f a sentence context. Further, Gernsbacher et al. (1991)
argued that such results can be attributed to the poor comprehenders being unable to
suppress the inappropriate meaning o f the SFW, such as PIANO, even when the context
does not suggest that meaning.
A related line o f work revealed that children (mean age = 8 years) who were
identified as poor comprehenders were less able to understand puns containing ambiguous
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words (Yuill & Oakhill, 1991). For example, the children heard riddles such as, "How do
you know there was fruit on Noah's Ark? ...because the animals came in pairs." The
poor comprehenders had difficulty understanding such riddles, as measured by their ability
to retell the riddles and explain why they were funny. However, these children performed
as well as good comprehenders in a test that measured their ability to understand
ambiguous words. In this test, the children were presented with a word orally and asked
to give two different definitions o f the word. One example was, pear-pair. Yuill and
Oakhill concluded it w as not a matter o f the poor comprehenders being less able to notice
the ambiguities, but rather, it might be that the poor comprehenders were less able to
determine which meaning was appropriate in the context o f the pun.
There is a similarity in this work with children and in Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990)
findings with adults, in that both lines o f research have shown that the Iow-ability
comprehenders are not simply less able to understand the various meanings o f the words
that they encounter. Therefore, Gernsbacher et al.'s conclusion o f an inefficient
suppression might be applicable to the Yuill and Oakhill (1991) findings. Gernsbacher and
Robertson (1995) claim that the poor comprehenders in this study do access both
meanings o f the ambiguous word, but are then unable to decide which one is appropriate
for making sense o f the information at hand.
Gernsbacher (1994) conducted a follow-up the Merrill et al. (1981) study, using an
adult population. As in previous work, participants were divided into high- and lowskilled comprehenders based on their performance on the Multi-Media Battery
(Gernsbacher & Varner, 1988). Participants read one o f three prime sentences that ended
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in a homophone. They then read a target sentence that was paired with the prime
sentence. An example is below:

Prime sentences:

SAME meaning: She lit the match.
NEUTRAL meaning: She saw the match.
DIFFERENT meaning: She won the match.

Target sentence:

She blew out the match.

After reading each sentence, participants decided whether or not the sentence
made sense by responding yes or no. Response times o f interest were those to the target
sentences after reading neutral prime sentences, in comparison to after reading same
meaning primes or different meaning primes. Results showed that both high- and lowskilled comprehenders experienced relative benefits from the same meaning primes. This
is shown by decreased response times to the target sentences after participants read the
same meaning primes. However, only the high-skilled comprehenders experienced costs
from the different meaning primes. These participants showed significantly slower
response times to the target sentences when the target sentences followed a different
meaning prime, in comparison to when the target sentence followed a neutral prime. The
low-skilled comprehenders did not exhibit this effect. Response times to target sentences
were not different following the neutral and different meaning primes. These findings
show that both high- and low- skilled comprehenders show enhancement when the target
followed same meaning primes, but only the high-skilled comprehenders show suppression
o f the different meaning primes.
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This study demonstrated that high-skilled comprehenders efficiently enhanced the
relevant meanings o f homophones when reading sentences and suppressed the
irrelevant meanings o f the homophones. Therefore, these readers make use o f sentence
context more efficiently than do low-skilled readers. Low-skilled readers, on the other
hand, process words in sentences in a similar fashion to the children who were identified as
poor comprehenders in the Merrill et al. (1981) study. That is, the poor comprehenders
keep active all meanings of the individual word meanings, rather than only the meaning
that is implied by the sentence.
This phenomenon has significance for the present set o f experiments. As was
discussed in the previous section on problem solving, much research in problem solving
has investigated the degree to which individuals are able to make use o f surface and
structural features o f information that is known to be available to them when they are
faced with a problem solving situation. As was outlined in the chapter on problem
solving, a number o f researchers have shown that poor problem solvers tend to focus on
surface features o f available information, while more skilled problem solvers focus on the
structural features o f the problem at hand (e.g., Novick, 1988; Stein et al., 1986). I will
argue that Gemsbacher’s suppression task, which is conceptually very similar to that used
by Merrill et al. (1981), will be a useful diagnostic tool for identifying not only poor
readers/suppressors, but also for identifying poor problem solvers. This is based on the
assumption that focusing on individual word meanings is similar to attending to surface
features o f problems. That is, focusing on surface features o f problems can be compared
to attending to individual word meanings, while focusing on structural features o f
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problems can be compared to attending to the underlying meaning o f sentences.
Also o f interest in the current paper is individuals' ability to discard information
that is known to be incorrect when attempting to solve problems. A common method o f
investigating this ability has been to provide a period o f time between successive attempts
to solve problems. It is expected that such a duration will serve to diminish the activation
o f incorrect responses so that participants can access correct solutions, if those solutions
are within the individual's domain o f knowledge. This is called an incubation procedure.
The literature involving incubation is the topic o f the next chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER HI

INCUBATION

This chapter first provides a summary o f the concept o f incubation as a general
phenomenon. As is discussed, the very existence o f this construct has been the subject o f
contentious debate. Regardless, a number o f researchers have investigated the usefulness
o f incubation intervals, with varying degrees o f success.

History and Theories o f Incubation
Incubation can be defined as an improvement in solution rate after a period during
which an unsolved problem has been put aside. Incubation has been the subject o f
numerous anecdotal reports o f discovery. For example, Archimedes is said to have
suddenly come upon his realization that the volume o f irregular objects could be
determined by water displacement as he settled into his bath (Gleitman, 1995). Wallas
(1926) proposed that an incubation period was essential for all problem solving. During
this period, earlier-considered ideas are worked on unconsciously, leading to an
illumination, in which the solution to the problem is suddenly realized.
This "unconscious processing” theory o f incubation has been criticized by
researchers who point out that the evidence for this phenomenon is based largely on
self-reports (Weisberg, 1993). Weisberg cites numerous unsuccessful attempts to
demonstrate the existence o f incubation in various fields, including art, literature, and
30
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science (e.g., Olton & Johnson, 1976; Patrick, 1935, 1937). Weisberg concludes that
problems are solved in an incremental fashion, based on trial and error.
In contrast to the unconscious processing theory o f incubation, Smith and
Blankenship (1989) have forwarded a blocking theory o f incubation. According to this
theory, the inability to access relevant information is the result o f this information being
obstructed by other, related information that is incorrectly accessed. Incubation effects
are the result o f this incorrect information no longer being available to the solvers on a
subsequent attempt to solve the problem. That is, activation o f the target response is
made possible when the competing information is no longer blocking the individual's
access to this target.
An alternative explanation for incubation was suggested by Yaniv and Meyer
(1987). This is the Memory-Sensitization Hypothesis, which states that even when a
problem is unsuccessfully solved, some partial activation o f the target solution takes place.
This activation sensitizes the individual to later accidental run-ins with related information
that might serve to raise the target information to the level at which it will be activated by
the individual. Further, as time passes, the likelihood that this chance encounter will take
place also increases. Support for each o f these theories is presented in the next section.

Empirical Research
Empirical investigations o f incubation effects have been few (e.g., Jones &
Langford, 1987; Murray & Denney, 1969; Olton, 1979; Patrick, 1986; Smith &
Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987). Further, the finding of incubation
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effects in these studies has varied. For example, Patrick (1986) found incubation effects,
but only in high-skilled problems solvers. Murray and Denney’s (1969) findings o f
incubation effects were limited to low-skilled problem solvers. Smith and Blankenship
(1991), in five experiments, found varied effects o f ability level on incubation.
In a test o f their blocking hypothesis, Smith and Blankenship (1989) employed a
clever methodology. This procedure involved inducing a fixated state in participants.
Using this procedure, participants were fixated on inappropriate responses to a series o f
picture-word puzzles that Smith and Blankenship referred to as rebuses. An example o f
such a rebus is "timing tim ing.” The solution to this is "split second timing." The rebuses
were presented on two trials. On the first trial, a misleading clue was presented along with
the rebus. The purpose o f this clue was to fixate the participants on the misleading
response, and thereby block the appropriate response. For example, one rebus was "you
just me,” which represents "just between you and me." The misleading clue in this
example was "beside."
On the initial experimental phase, participants attempted to solve these rebuses.
This phase was followed by one o f two second phases. In the control condition,
participants were immediately presented with the same rebuses to solve. In the incubation
conditions, participants performed a demanding math test for several minutes and then
attempted to solve the rebuses a second time. Results showed that the incubation group
exhibited superior performance on the second trial, while the control group did not. That
is, an incubation effect was found. Further, when tested for their memory for the
misleading clues, the incubation participants showed poor memory for the distractors,
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while the controls did not. Taken together, these findings led to Smith and Blankenship's
(1989) conclusion that incubation effects are the result o f a reduced activation level o f
inappropriate information. In other words, participants who no longer recalled the
distractors showed incubation effects.
These findings raise the possibility that individuals who are shown to possess
inefficient suppression mechanisms, as measured by the Gernsbacher et al. (1990) task,
will solve fewer problems, and will also demonstrate decreased benefit from an incubation
period, compared to individuals who exhibit efficient suppression mechanisms. This result
is anticipated because it is expected that the poor suppressors will have the misleading clue
information available to them for an extended period o f time, making the access o f the
appropriate answers less likely. This is conceptually similar to the expectation for the
previously-described riddle experiments. That is, the poor problem solvers will be those
who exhibit poor suppression skills and these individuals will benefit less from an
incubation interval than will more highly skilled problem solvers.
One theoretical issue that might appear to be problematic is the fact that
Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990) measure o f suppression show the perseveration effect for only
a brief period o f time. In this study the effect has been shown to continue for a duration o f
one second in the poor suppressors. The present set o f experiments will investigate the
possibility that suppression failure is the cause o f more long-term deficiencies. This
assumption is not without precedent in the literature (e.g., Hartman & Hasher, 1991;
Merrill & Sperber, 1981; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987).
Hartman and Hasher (1991) conducted a test o f the Inhibition Hypothesis in older
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and younger adults. Their procedure involved presenting young and old adults with
sentences that were missing the final word. These sentences were high-cloze sentences,
(i.e., the final word was highly suggested by the sentence). For example, one sentence
read "She ladled the soup into h e r

." The task was to predict the ending o f each

sentence. Subsequently, the participants were presented with the actual last word in the
sentence. They were told to remember only this word, and not the word that they had
predicted, but that had been disconfirmed. In the above example, the supplied word was
"lap," and the disconfirmed word was "bowl."
Hartman and Hasher (1991) then administered an indirect memory test to
investigate the activation level o f both the disconfirmed words (e.g., "bowl") and the
target words (e.g., "lap"). Participants were presented with sentences for which the final
word was missing. They read the sentences out loud and completed each sentence with
the first word that came to mind. These sentences were constructed in pairs, such that one
sentence in each pair had the earlier-disconfirmed ending as the most likely ending. The
other was most likely to be completed by the word that had actually been presented in the
first part o f the experiment. For example, one pair was: "Scotty licked the bottom o f the
BOWL," and "The kitten slept peacefully on her owner's LAP," with the likely endings
presented in caps here. In this way, activation o f the presented and disconfirmed endings
was determined by the time taken to produce the sentence final words.
Results showed that the older adults showed activation o f both words, while the
younger adults showed activation o f only the target words. Hartman and Hasher (1991)
concluded that older adults' inhibitory mechanisms were impaired, and therefore, they
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were less able to inhibit the extraneous information. O f particular importance to the
present set o f experiments, the increased activation o f the inappropriate response had a
rather lengthy duration. Hartman and Hasher measured this activation with a five-minute
delay between the completion o f the initial task and the onset o f the indirect memory test.
In a similar fashion, Yaniv and Meyer (1987) found activation o f primed
information after a thirty-minute period. These researchers used a tip-of-the-tongue
(TOT) paradigm similar to that pioneered by Brown and McNeill's (1966) classic work.
Similar to the Brown and McNeill studies, Yaniv and Meyer presented participants with
definitions o f rare words, such as "sextant” and "Damascus.” In instances that participants
did not produce the target word, they reported how confidently they thought that they did
know what the word was. That is, they reported whether they were experiencing a TOT
state. This was followed by a lexical decision task, which included the rare words as well
as control words for each o f the rare words. Finally, participants were given an old-new
recognition task on which they had to decide whether the words on this task had
previously appeared on the lexical decision task.
Two results are o f particular relevance. First, response times on the lexical
decision task and the old-new recognition task were faster for the target words than for
the control words both when the participants correctly produced the rare word, and when
the participants reported a TOT for the rare word. This suggests that activation o f the
target words continued for at least a thirty-minute period. Second, in the TOT condition,
participants reported a feeling-of-knowing rating (Metcalfe, 1986) for the required word.
These subjective ratings were inversely related to reaction times in the lexical decision and
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new-old recall tasks. That is, words that elicited stronger feeling-of-knowing ratings
resulted in faster reaction times for the two indirect memory tests. Yaniv and Meyer
(1987) concluded that the target words are available even after this long duration o f thirty
minutes, regardless o f whether the word had actually been accessed in the TOT portion o f
the test. These indirect memory tests seem especially powerful with respect to the
feeling-of-knowing rating, given that previous researchers have voiced concerns over
whether participants might try harder on direct memory tests when they know that they
have given a high feeling o f knowing judgment for a particular item (e.g., Gruneberg,
Monk, and Sykes, 1977).
While Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) data provide a basis for assuming that activation
can persist for a long period o f time, it should be noted that these researchers attribute
their results to quite a different mechanism o f incubation than the one posited by Smith
and Blankenship (1989). That is, while Smith and Blankenship conclude that incubation
effects are due to the blocking o f appropriate information at a given time and the
subsequent lowering o f the activation level o f this extraneous blocking information, Yaniv
and Meyer's Memory-Sensitization Hypothesis assumes an incubation mechanism that is
similar to what has been the prevailing wisdom concerning incubation. According to the
hypothesis, even when a problem is not solved, the solution is activated to some degree.
As time passes, the individual is likely to encounter similar information that serves to
activate the target information.
These two hypotheses do not seem to be completely at odds with one another. It
might be that, as the activation level o f competing responses is decreased with passing
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time, the likelihood o f encountering some triggering stimulus is increased. Yaniv and
Meyer (1987) took no measure o f the words that the participants may have considered,
but not produced, in the no recall condition. Therefore, the degree to which distractors
might have been active at both the TOT phase and the indirect memory testing phases is
unknown.
To summarize, the Smith and Blankenship (1989) blocking paradigm provides a
method o f inducing fixation subsequently examining the benefit o f various incubation
intervals in overcoming this fixation. This method will be utilized in the present set o f
experiments, both by using the Smith and Blankenship methodology and by relating the
paradigm to other problem solving materials, such as the previously-mentioned riddles.
Further, the Yaniv and Meyer (1987) data, and the Hartman and Hasher (1991) data,
provide a basis for the assumption that suppression effects can be expected at longer time
durations than have been previously demonstrated (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1990). It is
predicted that these long-term effects will be present to a greater degree in those
individuals who demonstrate inefficient suppression ability in the Gernsbacher et al.
paradigm. Specifically, inefficient suppressors will not benefit from the decrease in
activation level o f incorrect responses that is normally afforded by period o f incubation.
Conversely, it was expected that the efficient suppressors will make use o f the incubation
period to discard the incorrect solutions. The following section furnishes a justification
for relating the usefulness o f an incubation period to problem solving and suppression
abilities.
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Incubation and Problem Solving Ability
Past researchers have demonstrated incubation effects using a variety o f problem
solving tasks (e.g., Dominowski & Jenrick, 1972; Jones & Langford, 1987; Murray &
Denney, 1969; Olton, 1979; Patrick, 1986; Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Yaniv &
Meyer, 1987). However, the finding o f differential effects o f incubation on competent
versus poor problem solvers has been inconsistent. Murray and Denny found incubation
effects, but only in low-skilled problem solvers. Patrick's incubation effects were limited
to the high-ability solvers. Smith and Blankenship (1991) found mixed results, with some
o f their five experiments showing greater incubation benefits for good problem solvers,
and other problems resulting in greater benefit for the poor solvers.
Smith and Blankenship (1991) related their findings o f incubation to the difficulty
o f the tasks administered in each o f their experiments. They concluded that "incubation
might be most likely to occur when easy-to-solve problems are initially thwarted by
fixation," (p. 83). They further speculate that the problem solving ability o f the individual
might be one determiner o f whether incubation would be beneficial to solution. In other
words, incubation intervals are most beneficial to low-skilled problem solvers when the
task o f interest is relatively easy. This is a reasonable conclusion, given that problem
solving could not be enhanced if the problems were simply too difficult for the individuals
to solve.
In an early study of incubation effects, Murray and Denny (1969) presented their
participants with Saugstad's "ball problem" (Saugstad and Raaheim, 1957). This problem
required participants to devise a method o f transferring a number o f steel balls from one
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area o f a room to another, using the objects available to them. These objects include
several types o f tools, including some string, a pulley, etc. Prior to attempting this task,
participants were categorized as high- or low-ability problem solvers according to their
scores on the Gestalt Transformation Test, which is a essentially a measure o f
susceptibility to functional fixedness. Each o f twenty problems requires the participant to
choose the one o f five given items that could best be used for a particular function. For
example, from the choices; tree, cigarette, shirt, bicycle, eyeglasses, from which could one
make a hose?
Results showed that the low-ability problem solvers benefited from an interrupted
period o f problem solving, in which they performed a demanding filler task. Conversely,
high-ability solvers performed better under a continuous session o f working on the
problem. Murray and Denny (1969) concluded that the low-ability solvers may have
benefited from the interrupted session because they were more prone to blocking effects
from the usual uses for the objects that were to be used to solve the problem. In
accordance with Smith and Blankenship's conjecture, Murray and Denny speculated that
the interruption by the filler task might have served to weaken the effect o f the fixated
responses in these low-ability solvers. With regard to the high-ability solvers, the
interruption o f work disrupted their ability to solve the problem. Murray and Denny
concluded that this effect was the result o f the high-ability solvers not fixating on the
stereotypical uses o f the objects, and therefore that interruption only served to disrupt the
"fluidity" of their solving process.
Smith and Blankenship (1991) followed-up their earlier work, using the Remote
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Associates Test (RAT) as a measure o f problem solving ability. Participants were
presented with a series o f three-word RAT items, for which they were required to produce
the common words. These RAT items were presented tw o times to all participants. For
fixation conditions, on the first trial the items were accompanied by distractor words that
were meant to fixate the participants. For example, the RAT item; LICK, SPRINKLE,
MINES was accompanied by the words, "tongue," "rain," "gold." The solution to this
example is "salt." Participants were told that the accompanying words were similar to the
correct solution, and that they should use these words to help them solve each RAT item.
Participants in the no-fixation conditions solved the RAT items without the presence o f
the distractors. On the second trial, all participants were presented with the same RAT
items to be solved a second time. On this trial, no distractors were presented to any
groups. The control group had no time interval between the two tests, while the
incubation group was given a filler test to perform before the onset o f the retest. This
entailed reading a compelling short story for which the participants expected to answer
comprehension questions.
Two effects o f interest were found. The first was that the participants who were
fixated on incorrect responses exhibited an incubation effect. That is, their solving
performance was significantly greater on the second trial than on the first. This supports
Smith and Blankenship's (1989) blocking theory, in that incubation results from the
removal o f the fixating information. Second, participants who had low scores on the
initial RAT exhibited the greatest incubation effects. However, in four subsequent
experiments, the effects o f ability level on incubation were mixed. In one experiment
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(Experiment 2), the incubation effect was limited to the medium-ability participants. In
another (Experiment 5), the effect was demonstrated only in the high-ability participants.
As mentioned earlier, Smith and Blankenship concluded that incubation effects are
evidenced when easy-to-solve problems are presented, along with some distracting
information.
While Smith and Blankenship's (1991) findings varied with respect to the
relationship between problem solving and incubation, previous research has shown that
high-ability problem solvers benefit more from an incubation period than low-ability
problem solvers do (Patrick, 1986). Patrick also used the RAT as a problem solving
measure. He concluded that high-ability problem solvers benefit more from an incubation
period than low-ability solvers because the high-ability solvers use the interruption as a
means o f breaking away from incorrect solutions and getting a "fresh start" when the
problem is re-presented. Low-ability solvers, on the other hand, return to the same
incorrect responses that they produced on the first presentation o f the problem. The
present hypothesis concurs with Patrick's analysis. It is expected that high-ability problem
solvers will make better use o f the incubation period because these individuals will be
better able to consider new solutions after a time away from working on them.
Past researchers have provided explanations for the failure o f participants to solve
problems in a non-incubation condition, using a variety o f problem solving tasks (e.g.,
Goldman, Wolters, & Winograd, 1992; Peterson, 1974; Rundus, 1973; Smith & Vela,
1991). In a free recall task o f a list o f words, Madigan (1976) had participants recall the
studied list items several times. He found that items that were not recalled on early recall
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attempts were successfully recalled on later tests, a phenomenon referred to as
reminiscence. This effect has been demonstrated numerous times in the literature (e.g.,
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). Madigan posited that participants experienced output
interference in the list recall task, such that retrieval o f some o f the Hons blocked access
to additional items. According to Madigan, reminiscence results when participants are
retested and the activation o f the previously-recalled items has decreased.
Rundus (1973) coined the term, "stopping rule," to describe the reminiscence
effect. This rule states that participants will stop their attempts to retrieve additional list
items after they have failed to retrieve any new items for some period o f time. In other
words, they will abandon the retrieval process when they surmise that further retrieval
attempts will not be successful. Smith and Vela (1991) suggested that the stopping rule
might be applied to fixation and incubation effects observed in the problem solving
literature. They posit that an incubation period serves to reduce the activation level o f
competing responses, or fixators, thus allowing access to other possible solutions at
retesting.

Attenuation o f Fixation Effects in Incubation Paradigms
As was shown in the previous section, the effects o f the distractors in the RAT
experiments were short-lived. Solution rates increased significantly after the incubation
periods. When provided with a second chance to solve the RAT items, in the absence o f
distracting words, participants were able to do so. This effect is in contrast to the results
o f the riddle experiments. In those experiments, participants did not exhibit a release from
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the fixating effects o f their initial solutions to the riddles. The current experiments
investigated fundamental differences in these two types o f problems that might contribute
to these differential attenuation effects.
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CHAPTER IV

EXPERIMENTS

The preceding discussion provides a context for the present set o f experiments.
The overview o f the suppression and verbal comprehension literature provides a
foundation for the claim that ineffective suppression mechanisms contribute to problem
solving deficits. To this end, Experiments 1 and 3 included an administration o f the
suppression measure developed by Gemsbacher et al. (1991). It was expected that
performance on this task will be related to performance on a series o f problem solving
tasks. Experiment I investigated the relationship between suppression efficiency and
ability to solve insight riddles similar to those used by Perfetto et al. (1983). Experiment 3
examined the possibility o f a similar relationship between suppression efficiency and
performance on the RAT test. The riddles task and the RAT task are conceptually similar
if one considers that both rely on the ability to make remote associations. For the RAT
task, this is based on ability to realize ways that words are related to each other via their
independent associations to other words, hi the riddles task, solvers must recognize the
relationship between the clue sentences and the riddles.
Experiments 2 and 3 examined the degree to which the fixating effects o f incorrect
responses could be attenuated by the introduction o f an incubation period. Experiment 2
made use o f the riddles in this endeavor, while Experiment 3 used the RAT items.
44
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Additionally, Experiments 3 and 4 investigated the effects o f problem solving ability on the
usefulness o f an incubation period.
Finally, Experiment 4 examined the degree to which fixation effects can be
manipulated by instructions. Participants were instructed either to attend to the distractors
or were encouraged to ignore them. This provided a method o f delineating between
strategies employed when solving the RAT hems and the effects o f the distractors, per se.
Because the experimental tasks used in the present dissertation are varied, Table 1
is included to aid the reader in keeping track o f the task(s) administered in each
experiment.
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Table I. Objectives and Tasks Administered: Experiments 1 - 4.

Experiment

Measures

Objectives

1

a) Insight Riddles
b) Suppression Task

Predict problem solving performance
from suppression skill.

2

a) Insight Riddles

Determine if fixation to riddle
solutions can be attenuated
by means o f an incubation period.

3

a) RAT
b) Suppression Task

Predict problem solving performance
from suppression skill.
Relate problem solving performance
to incubation effects.

4

a) RAT

Investigate the attentional component
involved in ignoring extraneous
stimuli.
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Expsrimgptl
In this experiment, participants were presented with two tasks. These were the
ambiguous words task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990), and a version o f the riddle
task used by Perfetto et al. (1983). The primary objective o f this experiment was to
determine if performance on the problem solving task was predictive o f performance on
the suppression task. In support o f Gemsbacher et al.'s general suppression mechanism, it
was expected that all readers would experience difficulty in rejecting ambiguous target
words at the 100 ms delay. It was further expected that readers who demonstrated poor
problem solving skills would continue to experience difficulty on the ambiguous words
task, even at the 850 ms delay. Participants who show high performance on the problem
solving task are not expected to show this difficulty at the 850 ms delay.
Problem solving ability was assessed in tw o ways. The first was by measuring
participants1ability to spontaneously transfer the information provided in the clue
sentences when presorted with the riddles. The second was a measurement o f their ability
to make use o f the clue information after being informed to do so. These measures were
used because it has been demonstrated that individuals are not likely to spontaneously
access such information (e.g., Perfetto et al., 1983). Therefore, using only the
spontaneous transfer measure to define problem solving ability would likely not yield
results o f interest.
Experiment 1 followed up on Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) findings. It was expected
that high-ability problem solvers, at least those who were able to access the clue
information in the informed condition, should experience diminished difficulty in rejecting
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the ambiguous target words at the long-delay interval. Such a finding would lend support
to Gemsbacher's claim that suppression is a general cognitive mechanism.
The riddle procedure was very similar to that used by Perfetto et al. (1983).
Several modifications were made to the riddle task for the present experiment. There
were four groups o f participants. All groups were presented with two trials o f the riddles.
The first trial contained half o f the riddles and the second trial contained all o f the riddles.
The baseline group solved the riddles without first being presented with the clue
sentences. All other groups were presented with the acquisition sentences prior to the first
presentation o f the riddles. The informed group was informed o f the relationship between
the acquisition sentences and the riddles before the first trial o f riddle solving. There were
two groups who were not informed o f this relationship. The first o f these groups was
identical to the uninformed group in the previous experiments. This group was informed
o f the relationship between the riddles and the acquisition sentences after the first solution
trial. This group will be referred to as U-L, to show that they were uninformed on Trial 1
and informed on Trial 2. The second uninformed group was never informed o f this
relationship between the acquisition sentences and the riddles. This group will be referred
to as the U-U group, to show that they were informed neither on Trial 1, nor on Trial 2.
To reiterate, the major changes in the riddle procedure in comparison to previous
experiments were the addition o f the second uninformed (U-U) condition, and presenting
the baseline group with the riddles on two trials. These changes were made to test a
phenomenon not addressed in the previous experiments using these materials, but that has
been demonstrated in other studies that have investigated practice effects in problem
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solving (e.g., Goldman et al., 1992; Lung & Dominoski, 1985). Goldman et al.
investigated the effects o f incubation periods on the solution rates o f anagrams. They
found that longer incubation periods did increase these solution rates. O f particular
importance to the present set o f experiments, their results also suggested a general effect
o f improvement on these types o f problems. That is, the data showed a trend for
increased performance in overall ability to solve anagrams, although the analysis was not
significant. This was shown by individuals' performance on new anagrams (those that had
not previously been presented) increasing during the incubation trials. In other words,
participants solved more anagrams on Trial 2 than they did on Trial 1, and this effect was
observed in both the old (previously presented) and the new anagrams. This suggests that
they might have become more skilled in their anagram solution ability. Although this
generalized improvement effect was not found to be significant in the Goldman et al.
study, the authors suggested that such a phenomenon might be considered in future
studies o f incubation.
The present experiment provided an investigation o f Goldman et al.'s (1992)
observation in two ways. The first was by examining the degree to which participants in
the baseline group show improvement from Trial 1 to Trial 2. Given that the baseline
group had no clue sentences to rely on, any increase in solution rate from Trial 1 to Trial 2
might be seen as a general increase in their ability to solve these types o f riddles. The
second method was similar to the first. By including the U-U group, a determination
could be made regarding the degree to which uninformed group might show improvement
in solution rate from Trial 1 to Trial 2, in the absence o f explicit instructions to use the
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clues.
Method
Participants. Eighty University o f New Hampshire undergraduates participated in
order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Twenty participants were randomly
assigned to each o f four experimental groups. These four groups were based on the riddle
condition that participants were presented with; baseline, U-I, U-U, and informed. All
participants also completed the ambiguous words task.
Materials. The puzzle materials were taken from Gardner (1978). These were
similar to those used by Perfetto et al. (1983) and were composed o f eleven insight riddles
and corresponding clue sentences, along with three filler riddles that did not have relevant
clue sentences. An example o f the riddles is as follows: "A minister marries several people
each week." This sentence served as a clue for the riddle, "A man who lived in a small
town in the U. S. married 20 different women o f the same town. All are still living and he
has never divorced any o f them. Yet, he has broken no law. Can you explain?" For Trial
1 presentation, the riddles were divided into two sets o f equal difficulty, A and B, based
on pilot studies. Each o f these sets consisted o f five o f the riddles, along with three filler
riddles. Additionally, the final riddle in each set was this item, "A man was caught in the
rain with no hat or umbrella. There was nothing over his head and his clothes got soaked,
but not a hair on his head got wet. How is this possible?" The clue sentence for this
riddle was, "After taking a shower a bald man does not have to dry his hair." This riddle
was not included in the analysis, but was included to demonstrate to informed groups the
relationship between the riddles and the clue sentences. Therefore, each set contained a
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total o f 9 riddles. Each set was further divided into two subsets by randomizing the order
o f presentation o f the riddles in the set. These materials are included in Appendix A.
The suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) was also administered.
These materials include short sentences that end in either an ambiguous word or in a nonambiguous word. For example, one sentence was, "He dug with the spade," or "He dug
with a shovel.” A test word followed each sentence. This word was related to the
"other” meaning o f the ambiguous word. In the given example, the test word is "ACE,"
which is related to the non-presented meaning o f "spade,” but not to the meaning used in
the sentence context. Eighty filler sentences also were used. These sentences were similar
to the experimental sentences, except that the test word was related to the meaning o f the
sentence. For example, the sentence, "She liked the flower," was followed by the test
word, "ROSE." The experimental sentences all required a "no" response, while the filler
sentences required a "yes" response. Four stimulus sets were constructed. Across these
sets, each o f the experimental sentences occurred once in each o f the four experimental
conditions; 100 ms ambiguous, 100 ms unambiguous, 850 ms ambiguous, and 850 ms
unambiguous.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f the four experimental
groups, based on the riddle condition that they received. They were tested individually in
an experimental session that lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants were first
presented with the suppression task. In this task, sentences were presented one word at a
time on an IBM 486 computer. Each sentence was followed by a test word that appeared
either 100 ms later (immediate interval) o r 850 ms later (delayed interval). The test word
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was capitalized and surrounded by asterisks, for example: **ACE**. Each word in the
sentences was presented for a duration equal to a constant o f300 ms plus 16.7 ms per
character. The interval between each word was 150 ms. Participants were instructed to
response "yes" if the test word matched the meaning o f the sentence that they just read
and to respond "no" if the test word did not do so. They responded "yes" by pressing the
"z" key with the left index finger, o r "no" by pressing the "/" key with the right index
finger. Participants were provided with feedback after each trial. This task required
approximately 15 minutes for completion. The dependent variable was recorded as the
time required to respond "yes" o r "no."
After completing the suppression task, all participants except those in the baseline
group were presented with the eleven clue sentences on a Macintosh SE computer. An
additional two sentences were presented as fillers, one at the beginning and the other at
the a id o f the list o f sentences, for a total o f thirteen acquisition sentences. Participants1
task was to rate the truthfulness o f each sentence. Participants were instructed to read
each sentence carefully and rate how truthful the sentence was, on a scale from 1 (never
true) to 5 (always true). Subsequent to the rating task there was a three-minute filler
period in which participants were asked for their student ID cards and their names were
recorded on attendance sheets. This filler period was designed to create a separation
between the rating task and the presentation o f the riddles.
Each group was presented with the riddles on two separate trials. On the first
trial, five o f the experimental riddles were presented. The first three were filler riddles,
also taken from Gardner (1978). These were included to further separate the rating task
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from the riddles. In total, there was approximately a six-minute delay between completion
o f the rating task and the presentation o f the experimental riddles. All participants were
told that they were would read a series o f puzzles that had difficult solutions and that their
task was to try to provide a solution for each riddle. The riddles were then presented one
at a time. Participants had one minute to type in their response to each riddle.
Participants in the informed group were told that the previous sentences would help in
solving most o f the problems. Neither uninformed group was told o f this relationship.
On the second presentation trial, participants were told that they would again be
presented with the same riddles to solve, along with some additional riddles. Participants
in the informed group and in the U-I group were told that the sentences that they rated
previously could serve as clues to helping them solve most o f the problems. To make this
point clear, the experimenter read the "bald" riddle aloud and the corresponding
acquisition sentence from the rating task. The bald riddle was not included in the data
analysis and was not included on Trial 2. U-U participants were not informed o f the
usefulness o f the acquisition sentence prior to Trial 2 solving. These participants were
simply told that they would receive another trial o f the same riddles, along with some
additional riddles.
All participants were asked if they had previously seen any o f the riddles and if
they had any prior knowledge o f the experimental procedure. This resulted in elimination
o f one participant from the baseline group, one from the informed group, and two
participants from each o f the uninformed groups. These participants were replaced with
additional participants.
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Results
Solutions to the riddles and response times in the suppression task were recorded.
For the suppression data, responses that were incorrect, were more than three deviations
from the mean, or were greater than 2,000 milliseconds were discarded. This resulted in
elimination o f less than 9% o f the data. For all results reported in this dissertation,
analyses were considered significant at a 0.05 alpha level. All planned comparisons used a
Bonferroni procedure with a familywise error rate o f 0.05.
Riddle Performance. Preliminary analysis o f the riddle data looked for differences
between the two sets A and B o f Trial 1 riddles. This analysis revealed no differences in
solution rates for the two sets o f riddles. Therefore, all data were analyzed together.
Mean percentages for both trials are presented in Table 2.
Trial 1 data and Trial 2 data were analyzed separately. Trial 1 data for groups U-I
and U-U provided a measure o f spontaneous transfer, given that participants had not yet
been informed o f the relationship between the clue sentences and the riddles. A one-way,
between subjects ANOVA was performed on Trial 1 data. This analysis revealed a
significant main effect o f group, E (3, 76) = 15.3, MSe = 1.27. Planned comparisons
confirmed that the informed group solved more riddles than all other groups. Between the
informed and the baseline groups, 1 (18) = 6.58, informed and the U-I group, i (18) =
3.08, and informed and the U-U group, t (18) = 4.48. Also, the baseline group solved
fewer riddles than the U-I group, i (18) = 3.50, but the comparison between the baseline
and U-U groups did not reach significance, t (18) = 2.10, p = .23. Thus, the only
unexpected finding was that U-I participants solved significantly more riddles on Trial 1
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Table 2. Mean Solution Percentages for Riddle Trials 1 and 2: Experiment 1

Trial 2

Trial 1

Old

New

Condition

M

SD

M

SD

M

Baseline
U-I
U-U
Informed

6.0
31.0
21.0
53.0

9.4
27.4
19.9
29.2

5.0
40.0
27.0
62.0

8.7
24.4
20.2
25.2

16.0
51.0
44.0
51.0
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SD

19.6
21.4
18.6
25.6
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than did the baseline group. This provides evidence for spontaneous transfer in this group.
Trial 2 data were analyzed using a 2 (old/new) by 4 (group) mixed ANOVA. This
revealed a significant main effect o f the old/new variable, E ( l, 76) = 5.99, MSe = .76.
There was also a main effect o f group, E (3, 76) = 22.2, MSe = 1.56. O f particular
interest, there was a significant interaction between these two variables, E (3, 76) = 4.49,
MSe = 3.41.
An analysis of simple main effects showed that both groups o f uninformed
participants solved significantly more new problems than old problems on Trial 2. For
U-U, 1(19) = 4.68, and for U-I, t (19) = 2.15. For the baseline group, the difference was
very close to significant, in the direction o f more solutions to new than old problems, I
(19) = 2.02, p = .06. Finally, the informed group solved more old problems than new, but
this difference did not approach significance, 1(19) = 1.27, p = .22. Thus, the data for this
old/new variable replicate the results o f Perfetto et al., for the uninformed groups.
Suppression And Problem Solving Abilitv. Also o f interest was the relationship
between the suppression task data and participants' problem solving ability. This ability
was measured in two ways. The first was participants' ability to make use o f the clues
sentences without being instructed to do so (spontaneous transfer). The second was the
ability to make use of the clue sentences after having been instructed to do so (informed
transfer). These analyses are described separately.
Suppression and Spontaneous Transfer Ability. Data from the two uninformed
conditions (U-I and U-U) performance on Trial 1 o f the riddle task were used to
categorize participants into two groups; those who showed evidence for spontaneous
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transfer and those who did not. Successful transferrers were defined as participants who
scored above the median on Trial 1. The no-transfer group solved below the median on
Trial I . This division resulted in 14 participants in the transfer group and 26 participants
in the no-transfer group.
Mean reaction times for the two groups o f participants at each delay interval o f
the ambiguous words task are shown in Table 3. Separate 2 (transfer ability) x 2 (degree
o f ambiguity) ANOVAs were used to analyze the amount o f interference that participants
experienced at each delay interval. That is, the difference between participants' mean
reaction time to reject ambiguous words at the 100 ms interval was compared to their
mean reaction time to reject unambiguous words at 100 ms. Likewise, this comparison
was made for the 850 ms interval.
At the 100 ms interval, both groups o f participants suffered significant interference
from the ambiguous sentence-final word (SFW). A main effect o f ability level was found,
with the high ability transfer group displaying faster overall reaction times, E (1, 38) =
17.4, MSe = 43,483. There was also a significant main effect o f degree o f ambiguity, E
(1, 38) = 37.3, MSe = 2,068. The interaction between these factors approached, but did
not reach significance, E (1, 38) = 3.90, MSe = 2,068, p >.05. Simple effects tests
revealed a significant difference for the no-transfer group between the ambiguous and
unambiguous conditions at this delay, 1 (25) = 5.50. The transfer group showed the same
effect, t (13) = 2.87. Thus, both the transfer and no-transfer groups displayed an increase
in response time to the target word when the SFW was ambiguous w ith respect to the
target word.
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Table 3. Mean Reaction Times for Spontaneous Transfer and No-Transfer Groups at 100
and 850 ms Delays: Experiment I

Delay Interval

100 ms

Ability

Ambig

High
Low

738
960

850 ms

Unambig

Diff

Ambig

Unambig

Diff

693
874

45
86

640
890

625
830

15
40
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The data for the 850 ms level also revealed a main effect o f ability level, £ (1 ,38)
= 16.2, MSe = 58,124. A significant main effect o f degree o f ambiguity was found, E (1,
38) = 14.3, MSe = 1,766. Importantly, an interaction effect was found at this delay
interval, E (1, 38) = 5.17, MSe = 1,766. Analysis o f ample main effects showed that the
no-transfer participants exhibited a significant difference in reaction times between the
ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, 1 (25) = 4.35. The high-ability
transfer participants did not exhibit differential response rates, t (13) = 1.83, g = .09.
In sum, these results demonstrate that the no-transfer participants are much slower
to respond overall. These individuals also take longer to reject the ambiguity, especially at
the 850 ms duration.
Regression analysis. An alternative way o f examining these results was through a
multiple regression analysis, which was applied to the data from the 850 ms delay
condition. The number o f riddles solved on Trial 1 was the dependent variable. The were
two predictor variables. The first was the difference in response time between the
ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. The second was the average response time for
the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. These predictor variables were chosen in an
effort to examine the relative effects o f the ambiguity manipulation and o f overall speed of
response.
This analysis revealed that the tw o variables together accounted for 27.5% o f the
variance (23.5% adjusted) in riddle solutions. Only the average response time variable
contributed significantly to the regression, t (37) = 3.29. The difference variable did not
make a significant contribution, 1 (37) = 1.11.
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Suppression and Informed Problem Solving Ability. A separate set o f analyses
was conducted for the informed trials o f the riddles. These analyses included Trial 2
solution rate for the U-I group and the informed group. Thus, these data were used as a
measure o f informed problem solving ability. Participants were again divided into high
and low scorers, on the basis o f performance on Trial 2. Participants scoring above the
mean were classified as high scorers, while low scorers were those who scored below the
mean on Trial 2. This classification was conducted separately for each o f the three
groups. This resulted in 19 participants in the low ability group and 21 in the high ability
group. Mean reaction times for each group at both the 100 ms and 850 ms delay interval
are shown in Table 4.
Separate 2 (problem solving ability) x 2 (degree o f ambiguity) ANOVAs were
again used to analyze the amount o f interference that participants experienced at each
delay interval. The analysis from the 100 ms delay is reported first. This analysis revealed
a main effect of ability level, with the high-ability problem solving group displaying faster
overall reaction times, E (1, 38) = 8.61, MSe = 41,287. There was also a significant main
effect o f degree o f ambiguity, with fester response times to the unambiguous versus
ambiguous words, E (I, 38) = 56.2, MSe = 1,638. The interaction between these factors
also reached significance, E (1, 38) = 5.25, MSe = 1,638. Planned comparisons showed
that both groups experienced significant interference in the ambiguous condition. For the
high-ability solvers, 1 (18) = 5.66, and for the low-ability group, i (20) = 4.80.
The data for the 850 ms level also revealed a main effect o f ability level, E (1,38)
= 9.44, MSe = 59,818. A significant main effect o f degree o f ambiguity was found, E (I,
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Table 4. Mean Reaction Times for High- and Low-Ability Informed Problem Solvers at
100 and 850 ms Delays: Experiment 1

Delay Interval

850 ms

100 ms

Transfer Ability

High
Low

Ambig

Unambig

Diff

Ambig

Unambig

Diff

795
950

748
861

47
89

690
878

676
823

14
55
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38) = 14.8, MSe = 1,556. As in the 100 ms delay condition, an interaction effect was
found at this interval, E (1, 38) = 5.29, MSe = 1,556. Analysis of simple main effects
showed that the low-ability problem solvers continued to show significant differences
between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at the 850 ms delay, 1 (18) = 3.19.
This analysis approached but did not reach significance for the high-ability informed
solvers, t (20) = 2.04, p = .06.
The differences in reaction times in the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions are
larger for the no-transfer versus the transfer groups. This supports the prediction that the
suppression task is an appropriate marker o f problem solving ability. However, the
differences in the overall reaction times for these two groups o f participants are also
compelling.
Regression analysis To further explore the differential impact o f the difference
scores between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions, and o f overall response
speed, a multiple regression was conducted for the 850 ms duration. The number o f
riddles solved on Trial 2 was the dependent variable. Results showed that the two
variables accounted for 18.9% o f the variance (14.6% adjusted). As was the case in the
spontaneous transfer analysis, only the average speed variable contributed significantly to
the regression, 1 (37) = 2.5. The difference variable did not approach significance, t (37) =
.12
Discussion
Riddles Results. Results o f Experiment 1 are in accordance with major

predictions. One surprising finding was that o f significant spontaneous transfer in U -I
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condition. This is contrary to earlier findings by Perfetto et al. (1983) and others (e.g.,
Ross et al., 1989; Weisberg et al., 1978; but see Bowden, 1985). However, there was no
evidence o f transfer in group U-U. Several other results o f the riddle experiment replicate
earlier findings o f Perfetto et al.
O f particular interest to the present set o f experiments, the Trial 2 solution rate for
"old" problems was lower for the initially uninformed group than for the informed
participants, who were aware o f the relationship between the acquisition sentences and the

riddles on Trial 1. This finding was predicted from results o f the previous studies. In this
respect, U-U participants showed a pattern o f Trial 2 solving similar to that o f the U-I
group. That is, U-U group displayed improvement from Trial 1 to Trial 2, and this
improvement was largely confined to the "new" riddles. These effects were somewhat
surprising, given that the U-U group was never informed o f the relationship between the
acquisition sentences and the riddles. This suggests that U-U group somehow became
"informed," or aware, o f this relationship without being explicitly informed. This finding
will be discussed further in the general discussion.
Suppression Efficiency and Spontaneous Transfer. Two results relating
suppression efficiency to problem solving are more pertinent to the primary focus o f this
dissertation. The first compared suppression ability to spontaneous transfer. The second
compared suppression ability to the ability to solve the riddles when participants were
informed o f the relationship between the acquisition sentences and the riddles. The former
ability might be characterized as the ability to recognize that some particular information is
relevant for solving a problem at hand and using that information accordingly. The latter
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process involves the ability to make use o f information when its relevance is already
known. Numerous studies have shown that simply possessing necessary information is not
sufficient to facilitate solving, but that individuals must also access that information at the
appropriate time (e.g., Perfetto et al. 1983; Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein et al., 1986).
These studies have shown that individuals are very unlikely to spontaneously access the
relevant information unless they are explicitly instructed to do so. In contrast, the present
experiment did show evidence for spontaneous transfer in the U-U condition.
The present experiment also showed evidence for a relationship between the
facility for spontaneous transfer in the riddle experiment and performance on the
suppression task, given that the interaction between transfer ability and level o f ambiguity
was very close to significant. Both groups, those who demonstrated spontaneous transfer
and those who did not, experienced difficulty in rejecting the ambiguous test words at the
100 ms delay condition. However, only the no-transfer participants continued to
experience difficulty in rejecting the ambiguous words at the 8S0 ms delay. This supports
Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) results and suggests that the suppression measure is an
appropriate predictor o f spontaneous transfer ability.
There was also a significant difference between the participants who did show
transfer and those who did not, with regard to overall reaction time on the suppression
task. The transfer participants demonstrated significantly fester reaction times at both
delay durations than the no-transfer participants. This finding replicates Gemsbacher et
al.'s (1990) results comparing reaction times for their high-and low-ability readers using
these same materials.
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Suppression Efficiency and Informed Problem Solving Ability. The results
comparing suppression performance for the high- and low-ability participants in the
informed solving conditions very closely parallel the results of the spontaneous transfer
conditions. For both the high- and low-ability informed solvers, there were increased
response times to the target word when the SFW was ambiguous with regard to the target
word. The interaction o f ability level and ambiguity reached significance at the 850 ms
delay, with the high-ability informed solvers displaying reduced differences in reaction
times at this delay, in comparison to the low-ability informed solvers.
The present experiment shows a similar relationship between the suppression
measure and informed problem solving. This result might be analyzed through the scope
o f the general suppression mechanism posited by Gemsbacher and colleagues (e.g.,
Gemsbacher et al., 1990; Gemsbacher & Robertson, 1995). Those experiments showed
that less-skilled readers are less able than high-skilled readers to suppress inappropriate
meanings o f ambiguous words (as was replicated here), less-skilled readers are less able to
suppress inappropriate meanings o f homophones, etc. It is important to note that these
experiments also showed that less-skilled readers were not inferior to high-skilled readers
in their ability to maintain activation o f appropriate meanings o f ambiguous w ords
(Gemsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gemsbacher & Robertson, 1995). This suggests that the
less-skilled readers are not experiencing difficulty with rejecting the ambiguous word
because they do not appreciate the meaning o f the sentence. Rather, the deficiency seems
to lie in the inability to discard irrelevant information in an efficient manner.
This conclusion can be directly applied to the riddles used in the present study.
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For example, consider the minister riddle. In order to successfully solve this riddle, one
must look beyond the most common meaning o f words such as, "marry," and "divorce."
While any college student would be able to report the multiple meanings o f such words if
asked to do so, that does not ensure that all o f them would consciously access these
multiple meanings in the context o f this riddle. From the present results, it seems that
individuals who exhibit poor suppression ability on the on-line task developed by
Gernsbacher and colleagues are less able than their high-ability counterparts to reject the
more familiar meanings o f common words, such as "marry,” in an off-line task.
This process is similar to that proposed by Gick and Holyoak (1983) in their
description o f good versus poor problem solvers. They showed that successful problem
solvers focused on structural similarities between base analogs and target problems when
solving the radiation problem, for example. Poor problem solvers, on the other hand,
focused on surface similarities between the base and target. In relation to the present set
o f experiments, it is assumed that realizing the proper word meanings indicated in each
riddle is central to making use o f the clue sentences (Bowden, 1985; Lockhart et al., 1988;
Stein et al., 1986). Given that the present experiment showed that poor suppressors
performed poorly on the riddle task, one might conjecture that they focus only on the
usual meaning o f those words as specified in the riddle. There was very little surface
similarity between the riddles and corresponding clue sentences, given that they shared
few common words, as shown by Bowden (1986) and Stein et al. (1988). Therefore, in
order to solve, that is; to access the correct information, even when directed to do so,
participants would have to perceive the structural similarity between the two sources o f
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information.
Experiments 3 and 4 further explored this possibility, using a different set o f
problem solving materials. In these experiments, the Remote Association Test (RAT)
(Mednick, 1962) was used as a measure o f the ability to ignore useless information when
solving problems. This allowed for the investigation o f the role that suppression ability
might play in the ability to make remote associations. Specifically, these experiments
determined whether high-skilled suppressors would also be better able to solve RATs.
In sum, the present experiment showed that poor suppression ability is correlated
with poor ability to solve the riddles, in both the spontaneous and informed conditions.
Past research that has focused on the characteristics o f those individuals who do exhibit
such skills (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Novick, 1988). The present results suggest that
suppression ability should be added to the list o f factors that contribute to skillful transfer,
both spontaneous transfer and directed. Experiment 3 will determine if the suppression
task can predict further predict problem solving ability on the RAT.
Experiment 2 investigated the possibility that the deleterious effects o f incorrect
solutions to the riddles on Trial 1 can be attenuated if the time between presentation o f
Trial 1 and Trial 2 is increased. It is predicted that solution rate to the "old" riddles will be
greater when the participants have been provided with an incubation period. This is
expected because it is assumed that the activation level o f the incorrect responses will
decline during the incubation period.
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Experiment 2
In this experiment, participants were presented with the same ten riddles used in
Experiment 1, in two separate trials. As in Experiment 1, the participants attem pted to
solve one-half o f the experimental riddles on Trial 1. Participants attempted to solve all o f
the riddles on Trial 2. The second trial was either immediately after Trial 1, o r after a 15minute incubation period.
Method
Participants. Participants were 32 University o f New Hampshire undergraduates
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Sixteen
participants were assigned each o f the two experimental groups.
Materials. Materials used were the same riddles and clue sentences that were used
in Experiment 1. Additionally, participants completed a paper and pencil version o f the
Remote Associates Test. This test was comprised o f 50 RAT items. The RAT was
included only as a filler task for the incubation period, therefore the results o f this test
were not analyzed.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in an experimental session that
lasted approximately 45 minutes. All participants first completed Trial 1 o f the riddles.
This consisted o f the three filler riddles and five o f the experimental riddles. Participants
were instructed that they would have one minute to type a response to each riddle. As in
Experiment I , it was stressed that they try to write a response to each riddle. The
incubation group then was given the paper and pencil RAT test that consisted o f 50 RAT
items. The test was explained to them and an example was given to ensure that the
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participants understood the procedure. They were given 15 minutes to solve as many o f
the RAT items as possible. The RAT task was presented as a filler task to ensure that
participants were distracted from working on the riddle responses during the incubation
period.
The experimenter returned after the 15 minute period and collected the RAT
papers. Participants were then presented with the ratings task. As in Experiment 1, they
were asked to read each clue statement carefully and rate it for truthfulness on the 1 to 5
scale. A brief filler period followed the ratings task, during which the participants were
asked for their student ID cards and their names and student ID numbers were recorded
on the attendance sheet. Participants were then presented with Trial 2 of the riddles.
They were instructed that they would receive the riddles that they had attempted to solve
previously, along with some additional ones. They were told that the sentences that they
had rated would help them to solve the riddles. To make this point clear, the experimenter
read the "bald" riddle and its corresponding clue sentence aloud.
The procedure for the no-incubation group was identical to that of the incubation
group, except that the order o f the administration o f the RAT test and the first trial o f the
riddles was reversed. In this way, the no-incubation group first completed the RAT, then
Trial 1 o f the riddles, then the ratings task, and after the filler period, were presented with
Trial 2 o f the riddles. Therefore, there was approximately a five-minute interval between
the completion o f the ratings task and the presentation o f Trial 2 riddles for both groups o f
participants.
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Results

Separate analyses were conducted for Trial 1 and Trial 2 riddles. No significant
difference was found between the tw o sets o f Trial 1 riddles. Therefore, these data were
analyzed together. Means for both trials are shown in Table S. A independent groups ttest on Trial 1 data revealed no significant difference between the number o f riddles solved
by the incubation and no-incubation groups, I (30) = .33, p = .73.
A one-way ANOVA on Trial 2 data showed no significant difference between the
incubation and no-incubations groups on number o f riddles solved, E(1, 30) = 2.50, MSe
= 2.03, p = .13. An further analysis o f the old/new factor revealed no difference in the
number o f old and new riddles solved, although this effect did approach significance, E (1,
30) = 3.00, MSe = .75, p = .09. The interaction o f group and the old/new factor did not
approach significance, E (1, 30) = .33, MSe = .75, p = .57. Simple effects tests showed no
difference between the old/new factor for the incubation group, 1 (15) = .70, p = .5. This
analysis was very close to significant for the no-incubation group, 1(15) = 2.07, p = .06.
In both cases, participants solved more new items.

Discussion
The purpose o f Experiment 2 was to determine if providing an incubation period
between the first and second exposures to the riddles would increase the percentage o f
riddles solved on the second trial. While the trends were as expected, the statistical
analysis did not find these trends reliable. Perhaps the most striking aspect o f this finding
is that Trial 2 solution rate to "old" riddles was no better than Trial 2 solution rate to
"new" riddles, although the clue sentences were presented after the first attempt to solve
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Table 5. Mean Solution Percentages for Riddle Trials 1 and 2: Experiment 2

Trial 1

Trial 2

New

Old

Condition

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Incubation
No Incubation

11.2
10.0

10.2
10.3

58.8
45.0

22.5
25.8

63.8
55.0

23.0
22.5
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the riddles. This might be conceptualized as proactive interference from the Trial 1
solutions, while previous work has demonstrated retroactive interference effects from
initial solution to "old" riddles (e.g., Adams et al., 1988; Perfetto et al., 1983). For
example, in the presort experiment, participants first attempted to solve riddles such as the
"minister" riddle. After doing so, they read the acquisition sentences that provided the
solutions to these riddles. If the participants recognized this relationship as they were
reading the acquisition sentences, then one might expect the Trial 2 solution rate for "old"
riddles to be higher than that for "new" riddles, particularly for the no incubation group,
given that these participants read the clue sentences only several minutes after first
attempting to solve the problems. However, the no-incubation group solved more "new”
problems than "old" problems, although this difference was not significant.
This finding o f fixation to self-generated responses on the riddle task differs from
previous research using other types o f transfer tasks, such as analogical transfer. For
example, Duncker (1945) noted that a few o f his participants initially produced solutions
to the radiation problem that might be considered correct. These included sending the
radiation through the esophagus, or using a lead shield to protect the surrounding tissue
from the excess radiation. In contrast to the present finding, Duncker and later
researchers (e.g., Gick & McGarry, 1992) showed that initial solution failures to these
types o f problems enhanced subsequent solving o f the problems.
In the present experiment, it is possible that participants believed their original
solutions to be correct, even in the incubation condition. This possibility is not as likely in
the radiation problem, given that the other possible solutions to the radiation problem are
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clearly flawed. In the riddles experiments, it is certainly possible that some participants
believe that polygamy is legal in Utah. Therefore, their solution to the minister problem
could seem reasonable to them.
Overall, there seem to be three possibilities for the present finding o f no decrease
in fixation effects from Trial I to Trial 2 solving, following the incubation period. The
first is that the participants believed their original solutions to be correct. This possibility
is supported by a pilot study in which participants were presented with Trial 1 o f the
riddles after completing the ratings task. Participants were instructed to write a solution
to each riddle, but only if they were certain that the solution was correct. I f they were
unsure if the solution was correct, they were instructed to leave the riddle unanswered.
The participants in this experiment provided solutions to nearly every riddle, although
their solution rate was no higher than Experiments 1 and 2 here. This suggests that the
participants1confidence for their solutions was very high.
It is also possible that the time allowed for the incubation period was insufficient to
facilitate a decline in the activation o f the competing response. This could be due to the
original response being generated by the participants. Previous work has shown that
information that is self-generated is better recalled than information that is simply read
(Slamecka & G raf 1978). Providing a much longer incubation period, such as a 24-hour
period, or even longer, might diminish the participants1tendency to experience fixation
from their incorrect responses on Trial 1. Previous researchers have shown that an
incubation period o f this duration resulted in greater improvement in anagram solution
rate, versus shorter durations (Goldman et al., 1992).
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Finally, the power to find significant differences might not have been sufficient in
this experiment. It is possible that a largo' sample size would reveal a significant
difference between solution rates to "old" riddles for the incubation versus no-incubation
groups.
While the solution rate to the initially unsolved riddles was not effectively
increased via an incubation period, it has been shown that an incubation period can result
in increased solution to other stimulus materials, such as a RAT (Patrick, 1986; Smith &
Blankenship, 1991). Experiment 3 made use o f the RAT to investigate several questions.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted in an effort to answer two questions. The first was
whether the suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) would predict
performance on the RAT. Such a finding would extend the results o f Experiment 1 to
show that the suppression task predicts ability on a different problem solving test.
The second objective o f Experiment 3 was to evaluate whether participants can easily
discard extraneous information when solving the RATs. To this end, the RAT items were
presented along with additional words that were meant to "block" participants1access to
the correct response. This is similar to the procedure that was used by Smith and
Blankenship (1991). In accordance with Smith and Blankenship's results, it was expected
that these blockers would diminish participants' ability to solve the RATs, in comparison
to participants who did not receive the blockers with the RAT items. It was also o f
interest to determine if the solution rate would increase significantly when participants
were provided with a second chance to solve the RAT hems after a period o f incubation.
Results o f this endeavor were compared to those o f Experiment 2. Perhaps the failure to
improve solutions to the "old" riddles in Experiment 2 with an incubation period were
particular to the riddles that were used in that experiment. While the riddles seem to elicit
firmly entrenched solutions that were not discarded even when participants wore told that
these solutions were incorrect, it is possible that participants will be better able to
disregard initial incorrect responses to the RAT, after being provided an opportunity to
solve the RAT hems in the absence o f the blockers.
Experiment 3 included three levels o f incubation. The first was a no-incubation
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level, in which participants were presented with each RAT item only once, for a total o f 60
seconds. The first 30 seconds was considered to be the first solution period (RAT 1), and
the final 30 seconds was the second attempt (RAT 2). The short-incubation condition was
the second level. In this condition participants attempted all RAT items, then were
presented with the same items again. The Iong-incubation condition was similar to the
short-incubation condition, except that a 10-minute incubation period was interpolated
between the first and second presentation o f the RAT items. During this period,
participants were presented with a variation o f the Sternberg (1966) letter-search task.
Method
Participants. Participants were 60 University o f New Hampshire undergraduates
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Ten participants
were assigned each o f the six experimental groups in a 3 (level o f incubation; no-, short-,
or Iong-incubation) by 2 (fixation; fixation or no-fixation) design.
Materials. Four tasks were presented to each participant. The first was the 18
Remote Associates Test (RAT) items (Mednick, 1962). These are shown in Appendix B.
Each item is made up o f a set o f three words. The task was to produce the fourth word
that forms a common phrase with each word on the set. The participants were given this
example; WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE. Fixation materials included three distractor
words that were presented along with each RAT set. The distractors provided for this
example RAT were; glass, sidewalk, and pane. The solution to this example problem was
"window." Four random orders o f presentation o f the RAT items were prepared.
The second task was the suppression measure (Gemsbacher et al., 1990) used in
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Experiment 1. The third task was a pencil and paper version o f the RAT that consisted o f
30 items. Finally, participants in the fixation conditions were presented with a recall test.
This was composed o f 10 o f the RAT items, presented one at a time. The task was to
recall as many o f the three distractors as possible for each presented RAT item.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in two sessions. The first session
was approximately one hour and the second session was approximately 20 minutes. Upon
arrival at the first session, the participants were randomly assigned to one o f the six
experimental groups. Three o f the groups were fixation conditions and three were no
fixation conditions.
The were three fixation conditions, which were divided according to the length o f
the incubation period that was interpolated between the first and second presentation o f
the RAT items. The first condition was a no-incubation condition, in which each RAT
item was presented for 30 seconds with the three distractors. This was followed
immediately by a 30-second presentation o f the same RAT item without the distractors.
The short-incubation group completed all 18 RAT items with distractors. After all 18
items were presented, the same items were presented again, in the same order. On this
second presentation the distractors were not presented. Please note that this was the
procedure that Smith and Blankenship (1991) referred to as their "no-incubation"
condition. The final RAT condition was the Iong-incubation condition. These participants
completed all 18 RATs with distractors. They then worked on an absorbing letter-search
task (Sternberg, 1966) for a period o f 10 minutes. The second presentation o f the RATs,
without distractors, followed this incubation period. AO experimental RAT items were
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presented for a total o f 60 seconds. For all groups, RAT 1 was the first 30-second
presentation o f the hems and RAT 2 was the second 30-second presentation.
The no-fixation groups were divided in a similar fashion. The no-incubation group
was presented with each RAT hem for a total o f 60 seconds. The first 30 seconds was
considered as RAT 1, and the second 30 seconds was recorded as RAT 2. The shortincubation group completed all 18 RAT hems. They were then presented with all hems
again. The Iong-incubation group completed the 18 RATs, worked on the letter searching
task for 10 minutes, then were presented with RAT 2.
The experimental RAT hems were presented on a Macintosh SE computer. Each
three-word RAT hem was presented on a separate page. In the fixation conditions, the
RATs were presented along with the three distractor words. Fixation participants were
shown this example item: WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE, along with the clues:
"glass," sidewalk," and "pane" printed beneath their corresponding RAT word (see
Appendix). Participants were instructed that their task was to think o f a fourth word that
formed a common phrase with each o f the three words in the set. They were also told that
the clue words were provided to make the task easier for them. It was explained to
participants that the clues were very similar to the correct answer.
Participants were further instructed that each RAT item would be presented for 30
seconds and that they should type their response as soon as they knew it, in a box
provided at the bottom o f each page. They were told to spend the entire 30 seconds
working on each item. That is, that they were not to press the return key unless they had
typed in their response. Incubation participants were not informed that they would be
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retested. No-incubation participants were told that they would receive each RAT item for
a total o f 60 seconds, with the first 30 seconds including the "clues," and that the second
30 seconds would contain only the three RAT words.
Participants in the no-fixations conditions were given similar instructions. All were
shown the example RAT and its solution to ensure that they understood the task before
beginning. The no-incubation group was told that each RAT item would be presented for
60 seconds. Participants in the two incubation conditions were not informed that they
would be retested.
Following RATs 1 and 2, the fixation participants were presented with the recall
task. This task was comprised o f 10 o f the RAT items, presented without distractors.
Each item was presented individually. Participants were shown the example RAT item
(WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE) and were reminded o f the distractors that had been
presented in this example. They were told that they would be presented with some o f the
sets o f RATs that they had just completed and that their task was to recall the three clue
words that had been presented along with each RAT on the first presentation. Participants
were provided with as much time as necessary to type in as many o f the clues as they
could recall.
The final test administered in Session 1 was the pencil and paper version o f the
RAT. Participants were given 15 minutes to solve as many o f the 30 RAT items as
possible.
Session 2 consisted o f a single task. This was the suppression task that was used
in Experiment 1. The materials and procedure for this task were identical to those detailed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
in Experiment 1. This session lasted approximately 20 minutes.
Results
RAT 1 and RAT 2 Solution Rates. Data from RAT 1 and RAT 2 were analyzed
separately. A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA was conducted on RAT 1 solution
rate. This analysis showed a significant main effect o f fixation, with higher solution rate
for the no-fixation groups, E (1, 54) = 30.5, MSe = 5.35. Neither the main effect o f
incubation, E (2, 54) = .07, MSe = 5.35, nor the interaction, E (2, 54) = .53, MSe = 5.35,
o f the tw o factors approached significance. Mean solution percentages for all groups are
given in Table 6.
A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA was conducted on RAT 2 solution rate.
This also revealed a significantly higher solution rate for the no-fixation groups, E (1, 54)
= 9.06, MSe = 7.53. The main effect o f incubation did not reach significance, E (2, 54) =
2.35, MSe = 7.53. The interaction o f fixation and incubation did not approach
significance, E (2, 54) = .39, MSe = 7.53.
Improvement Effects. An analysis o f improvement effects was conducted to
determine if there were differences in improvements in solution rates between the various
conditions. Improvement was defined for each participant as the number o f RAT items
solved on RAT 2 that were not solved on RAT 1. A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA
revealed a main effect o f fixation, with the fixated groups demonstrating greater
improvement, E (1, 54) = 10.5, MSe = 1.95. The main effect o f incubation was also
significant, with the groups that had an incubation period between presentations o f each
RAT item showing greater improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, E (2, 54) = 10.3, MSe =
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Table 6. Mean Solution Percentages for RATs 1 and 2: Experiment 3

RAT I

RAT 2

Condition

M

SD

M

SD

38.3
42.8
38.9

10.9
19.4
10.6

43.9
53.9
50.6

10.9
19.6
11.2

5.6
11.1
11.7

23.9
20.0
21.1

7.9
11.6
10.8

31.1
38.3
43.3

11.7
16.0
15.3

7.2
18.3
22.2

Improvement

No Fixation
No Inc
Short Inc
Long Inc
Fixation
No Inc
Short Inc
Long Inc
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1.95. The interaction o f these two factors did not reach significance, E (2, 54) = 1.68,
MSe = 1.95.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing the three incubation durations for
both the fixation and no-fixation conditions. For the no-fixation condition, this analysis
revealed no significant differences in improvement for the no-, short-, and Iong-incubation
groups, E (2, 28) = 1.90, MSe = 1.95. A significant effect was revealed between the three
fixation conditions, E (2, 28) = 10.1, MSe = 1.95. Planned comparisons showed that the
no-incubation group had lower improvement than both the short-incubation, t (28) = 3.21,
and the Iong-incubation groups, 1 (28) = 4.33. The short- and Iong-incubation groups did
not differ in the degree o f improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, i (28) = 1.12.
Suppression and Problem Solving Ability. Also o f interest was the relationship
between performance on the inhibition task and solution rate on the RAT task.
Participants were defined as high, medium, or low ability problem solvers based on their
scores on the pencil and paper rat. High ability participants were those who scored above
the median. Medium ability participants scored at the median, and low ability participants
scored below the median. This division resulted in 23 high-ability, 14 medium-ability, and
23 low-ability participants. Means for these groups are shown in Table 7.
A 3 (problem solving ability) x 2 (level o f ambiguity) ANOVA was conducted.
Due to attrition, inhibition data were available for only 52 participants; 21 high-ability, 13
medium-ability, and 18 low-ability participants. Separate analyses were carried out for the
850 ms delay and the 100 ms delay conditions. Results o f the 100 ms condition will be
reported first.
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Table 7. Mean Reaction Times for High- and Low-Ability RAT solvers at 100 and 850
ms Delays: Experiment 3

Delay Interval

100 ms

Ability

High
Medium
Low

Ambig

768
806
918

Unambig

728
783
831

850 ms

Diff

Ambig

40
23
87

682
777
881

Unambig

Diff

673
768
784

9
9
97
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This analysis showed a main effect o f group, E (2, 49) = 3.63, MSe = 43,167. The
main effect for ambiguity was also significant, with the response times for the
unambiguous target words being faster than for the ambiguous targets, E (1,49) = 35.7,
MSe = 1,759. The interaction o f these factors was also significant, E (2, 49) = 5.25.
Simple effects tests showed that the high-and low-ability groups had significant
differences between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, i (20) =
3.21, and t (17) = 5.34, respectively. There was no difference for the medium-ability
group, 1(12) = 1.85.
An analysis o f the data from the 850 ms condition showed a significant main effect
o f group, with the E (2, 49) = 5.96, MSe = 39,941. There was a significant main effect o f
ambiguity, with foster reaction times recorded for the unambiguous condition, E (1, 49) =
21.1, MSe = 1,745. The interaction between ability level and ambiguity was also
significant, E (2, 49) = 12.9, MSe = 1, 745.
Simple effects tests showed that only the low-ability group showed a difference in
reaction times between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, t (17) =
5.87. The high-ability group showed no difference, I (20) = .71. The medium-ability
group also showed no difference, 1 (12) = .94.
Regression analysis. A multiple regression was performed using score on the
paper version o f the RAT as the dependent variable. As in Experiment 1, the two
predictor variables were the difference scores between the ambiguous and unambiguous
conditions and the average o f the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. This analysis
was conducted for the data in the 850 ms delay condition. Results showed that the two
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variables together accounted for 28.6% o f the variance (25.7 adjusted). Both variables
contributed significantly to the regression, t (49) = 2.77, and t (49) = 2.25 for the average
and difference variables, respectively.
Improvement Effects and Problem Solving Ability. To examine the effect o f the
incubation periods on RAT solution for participants o f varying ability levels, scores on the
pencil and paper RAT were used to predict improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2. For this
analysis, data from the 40 participants in the two incubation groups were used. This
division yielded 16 high-ability, 8 medium-ability, and 16 low-ability participants. A one
way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the groups, E (2, 37) = 5.26, MSe
= 2.63. Pairwise comparisons showed that the only significant difference was that the
high-ability solvers showed greater improvement scores than the low-ability group, i (37)
= 2.95. No other paired comparison approached significance. Means are given in Table
8.

Distractor Memory. Data from the recall task were analyzed for the fixation
groups. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the three groups, E
(2, 27) =16.7, MSe = 13.87. Planned comparisons showed that the no-incubation group
recalled significantly more o f the distractors than the two incubation groups, 1 (27) = 4.55,
1 (27) = 5.33, for the difference between the no-incubation group and the short-incubation
group, and between no-incubation and Iong-incubation group, respectively. Means for the
three groups are given in Table 9. Thus, these results parallel those comparing
improvement effects between the three groups. Here, it is shown that the continuation o f
the fixation effect in the no-incubation condition, that is; no improvement, is accompanied
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Table 8. Mean Improvement for High-, Medium-, and Low-AbOity RAT Solvers:
Experiment 3.

Incubation Effect

Ability Level

High
Medium
Low

M

SD

3.56
3.57
1.88

1.9
2.1
1.0
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Table 9. Mean Distractors Recalled in No-, Short-, and Long-Incubation Conditions.

Distractors Recalled

Incubation Condition

None
Short
Long

M

SD

18.6
11.0
9.7

4.8
3.0
3.0
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by a high availability o f the blocking information, compared to that for the two incubation
conditions.
P isCUSSipn

Results of Experiment 3 extend those o f the previous experiments in several
important ways. Most importantly, the suppression task proved useful in predicting
problem solving ability, as measured by the RAT. This strengthens the finding o f a
relationship between the suppression task and the riddle solving task in Experiment 1. The
finding further supports Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) claim that their suppression task has
value as a tool for predicting general cognitive abilities. It can be concluded that the
suppression task is a reliable indicator o f both o f these problem solving skills.
Additionally, the overall speed o f response to the ambiguous and unambiguous words
predicted success on the RAT.
The present results contrast with those o f the first two experiments, with regard to
the diminishing of fixation effects. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the fixating effects o f the
initial incorrect responses was evident at re-testing both immediately (Experiment 1), and
after a period of incubation (Experiment 2). In contrast, the distracting information
provided in Experiment 3 had a short-lived effect. This can be seen by comparing the
improvement on RAT 2 for the no-incubation participants versus the incubation
participants. While the no-incubation participants, both fixated and non-fixated, showed
virtually no improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, all other groups did demonstrate
increased solution rate. This increase in solution rate for the incubation conditions is
especially important in the non-fixation groups, because it suggests that participants do
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become "fixated" on some incorrect response, whether this response is experimentally
provided, or is generated by the participant. In both the fixation and non-fixation RAT
conditions, participants were able to discard this incorrect information during the
incubation period, as shown by significantly higher solution rate for RAT 2 versus RAT I.
Finally, the present experiment confirmed expectations that the high-ability
problem solvers would benefit most greatly from the incubation interval. This is contrary
to Smith and Blankenship's (1991) findings with the same materials, but does support
other incubation research (Patrick, 1986). The present assumption is that high ability
participants were better able to make use o f the incubation period as a means o f discarding
incorrect, blocking responses. Upon returning to the problems, these high ability
participants did not re-access the responses that they generated, or were provided to them,
on the first solution attempt.
It is possible that one reason for the high-ability solvers showing greater incubation
effects is that the problems were simply too difficult for the low-ability participants. If
incubation is defined as an increase in the solution rate o f solvable problems after a period
away from the problems, then the problems must be within the domain o f knowledge o f all
participants. Experiment 4 will examine this issue by using a procedure similar to that o f
Experiment 3, with the m ost difficult RAT items replaced with easier items.
A further question for Experiment 4 concerns the degree to which the effect o f the
blockers can be controlled by participants. In Experiment 3, the participants were
explicitly instructed to attend to the fixators because they would help them solve the
problems. It is likely that some participants realized that the blockers were not helping
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them to solve the problems. Several participants reported this phenomenon. However, it
seems that the participants were not able to avoid attending to the blockers. This is
supported by the observation that the participants fared no better in solving the last 9
items than in solving the first 9. If they did decide to ignore the "clues," they did not do so
successfully. An alternative possibility is that participants did not actively attempt to avoid
the clues.
Experiment 4 examined these possibilities by instructing some participants that the
distractor words were meant to be distracting and that they should attend only to the
words o f interest. This manipulation allowed me to determine the extent to which the
instructions that the "distractors" are helpful, and therefore should be attended to,
contributed the fixation effect. This "ignore" condition was compared to participants who
were told to attend to the information. It was o f interest to determine whether the
solution rate for the "ignore" participants would be significantly greater than for the
"attend" participants.
This inquiry was instigated from the results o f the first three experiments. In
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were unable to reject previously-generated responses.
However, in Experiment 3, participants were able to overcome the fixating effects o f the
previously-presented distractors, as shown by increased solution rate on Rat 2. This
suggests that the fixating effect o f the distractors in Experiment 3 might be partially due to
the instructions that these "distractors” would be helpful to solution, rather than
exclusively to the mere presence o f the distractors. In Experiment 3, participants attended
to the distractors voluntarily. This is in contrast to the usual way that distracting
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information reduces retrieval rate. For example, when experiencing a tip-of-the-tongue
state (TOT), participants are actively trying to reduce the activation o f (i.e., ignore) the
interloper (Jones, 1989), but are unable to do so.
A final objective o f Experiment 4 was to show that instructions to attend to or
ignore extraneous information can result in positive or negative impact on solution rate,
dependent upon the usefulness o f this extraneous information. Specifically, it will be
determined if instructions to ignore the information can actually decrease solution rate, if
that information provides a useful clue for solving the RAT item. Such a finding would
further support the theory that instructions exert a substantial effect on performance on
the RAT task. In this case, strategies to ignore the clues can be effectively implemented
by the participants. The method for testing this theory is outlined below.
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Experiment 4
This final experiment was designed to investigate three major questions. The first
was the degree to which it is possible to exert control over the effects o f distractors, (i.e.,
ignore the distractors) when those distractors are known to be detrimental to solution o f
the RAT hems. This was accomplished by presenting participants with a RAT procedure
similar to that used in Experiment 3, with several modifications. The most substantial o f
these was that some participants were told that the words accompanying the RAT items
were meant to be distracting and therefore, that they should ignore those words when
solving the RATs.
A second purpose was to determine whether the instructions to ignore the
distractors could prove to be detrimental to solution, when the distractors actually
provided useful clues. To this end, the final five RAT items, out o f a total o f 20, were
accompanied by clues that were helpful to solution. These items each contained one
"distractor" that was very similar to the solution. For example, the RAT hem: SKATE,
PICK, WATER was accompanied by the words: blade, choose, and bath. The last two o f
these words are the same distractors that were used in Experiment 3. The first word,
blade, was helpful to solution because together, "skate," and "blade" are very similar to the
solution word, "ice". If participants were successfully ignoring the accompanying words,
then it would not be expected that those who received these helpful dues would perform
better than partidpants who received distracting words on these five RAT hems.
The third purpose was similar to the second. In this case, h was o f interest to
determine how well partidpants who were instructed to attend to the distractor words
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would make use o f the five helpful clues. The procedure was identical to that described
above, except that the participants were instructed to attend to the words accompanying
the RAT items because these words would aid them in solving the items. This was the
same procedure followed in Experiment 3. As described above, the final five RAT items
were accompanied by the helpful clues. It was expected that the participants who received
the helpful clues on these items would be able to make use o f the clues, and solve more o f
these items than would the participants who received distracting words on the final five
RAT items.

Method
Participants. Participants were SO University o f New Hampshire undergraduates
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Ten participants
were assigned to each o f the four experimental groups, and ten participants made up the
control group.
Materials. Materials were similar to the RAT items used in Experiment 3. The
most difficult item was dropped from the set and replaced with an easier item, based on
pilot testing. Two additional items o f low difficulty were added, for a total o f 20 RAT
items in this experiment. These materials are included in Appendix C. There were two
attend groups: Helpful-Attend (HA) and Distracting-Attend (DA). These participants
were instructed to attend to the "clues" because they would help them solve the problems.
These were the same instructions given to participants in Experiment 3. In the HA
condition, the first 15 RAT items were accompanied by distracting "chies." The last 5
items were accompanied by helpful clues. In the DA condition, all 20 o f the
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accompanying "clues" were distractors. There were two ignore conditions: HelpfulIgnore (HI) and Distracting-Ignore (DI). The ignore participants were told that the words
accompanying the RAT items were meant to be distracting and therefore, that they should
try to avoid them when solving the RAT items. In the HI condition, the first 15 RATs
were accompanied by truly distracting distractors, while the last 5 were accompanied by
helpful "distractors." In the DI condition, all 20 o f the RAT items were accompanied by
distracting words. The control condition was the same as that in Experiment 3, with the
participants receiving only the RAT items without distractors on both experimental trials.
Thus, there were five groups o f participants: HA, DA, HL, DI, and control.
Other materials were similar to those used in Experiment 3. These included the
recall test for the participants in the four distractor conditions, and the paper and pencil
RAT for all participants.
Procedure. All participants received two trials o f the RAT items. Participants in
the attend conditions were instructed that the distractor words would help them to solve
the RATs and that they should pay attention to these words. The example given was the
same "window" example used in Experiment 3. The only difference between the HA and
the DA conditions was in the last S items. In the HA conditions, the last 5 distractor items
were helpful to solving the RATs, while these items were not helpful in the DA condition.
This same distinction applied between the HI and DI conditions. In these ignore
conditions, participants were told that the accompanying words were intended to distract
the participants from solving the RATs and that they should try their best to attend only to
the RAT words when solving the items. The control participants received the RAT items
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without any clues. All participants had 30 seconds to type their response on RAT 1. They
were again instructed to spend the entire 30 seconds trying to solve the each item.
On RAT 2, all participants received only the RAT items, without distractors. RAT
2 was presented immediately after the participants completed all items in RAT 1. Because
there were no differences found between the short-incubation and long-incubation
conditions in Experiment 3, RAT 2 was considered to be an incubation condition.
The recall and pencil and paper RAT procedures were the same as described in
Experiment 3.
Results
RAT 1 and RAT 2 Solution Data. Data from RAT 1 and RAT 2 were analyzed
separately. Within the RAT 1 analysis, the first 15 RAT items and the final 5 items were
analyzed separately. These separate analyses were conducted because the first 15 items
were the same for both attend groups and both ignore groups. The final 5 hems differed
between the groups, in terms o f the usefulness o f the "distractors."
A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the first 15 items, for the attend, ignore,
and control groups. This analysis revealed a significant effect, E (2,47) = 7.83, M Se =
3.89. Planned comparisons showed a significant difference between the attend and control
groups, t (47) = 3.60, with the control group solving significantly more o f the RAT 1
hems. The analysis between the attend and ignore groups also reached significance, 1 (47)
= 2.97, with the ignore group solving more hems than the attend group. The analysis
revealed no difference between the ignore and control groups, t (47) =1.18. M eans are
presented in Table 10.
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the data from the final five items on RAT
1, between the 5 experimental conditions: control, HA, DA, HI, and DI. This analysis
revealed a significant effect, E (4, 45) = 4.23, MSe = .74. Pairwise comparisons using the
Newman-Keuls procedure showed that this effect was due to the poor performance o f the
DA group. The solution rate for the DA group was significantly lower than all other
groups. For DA vs DI, I (45) = 3.65, for DA vs control, 1 (45) = 3.13, for DA vs HI, t
(45) = 3.13, and for DA vs H A I (45) = 2.86.
RAT 2 data were also analyzed with a one-way ANOVA that compared solution
rates for the five experimental groups. This analysis revealed no significant differences
between the groups, E (4,45) = 1.56, MSe = 6.56, p = .20. Means are given in Table 10.
Improvement Effects. As in Experiment 3, improvement was defined for each
participant as the total number o f RAT items solved on RAT 2 that were not solved on
RAT 1. A one-way ANOVA between the control, attend, and ignore groups revealed a
significant effect, E (2, 47) = 6.82, MSe = 1.79. Planned comparisons showed that
improvement was greater for the attend group than for the control group, 1 (47) = 3.67.
The difference between the ignore group and the control group did not reach significance,
i (47) = 2.12, p = .12. Comparison between the attend and ignore groups did not
approach significance, 1 (47) = 1.34. Means are provided in Table 11.
Distractor Memory. A t-test compared the percentage o f distractors recalled by
the attend participants and the ignore participants. This revealed a significant difference,
with the attend participants recalling more o f the distractors, t (38) = 3.88. Means are
presented in Table 12.
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Table 10. Mean Solution Percentages for RATs 1 and 2: Experiment 4

RAT 1

1st 15

RAT 2

Last 5

Total

Condition

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

HA
DA
HI
DI
Control

21.3
24.7
36.0
34.7
40.0

14.0
10.5
11.0
14.7
16.3

44.0
22.0
46.0
50.0
46.0

18.4
14.8
21.2
14.1
16.5

47.5
44.0
56.0
54.5
53.0

12.5
11.5
9.1
15.1
14.8
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Improvement Effects and Ability Level. Scores on the pencil and paper RAT were
used to classify participants as high-, medium- or low-ability RAT solvers. High-ability
participants were those who scored above the median, medium-ability participants scored
at the median, and low-ability participants scored below the median. This resulted in 16
high-ability, 7 medium-ability, and 17 low-ability participants. A one-way ANOVA
revealed no differences in the improvement scores for these three groups, F (2, 47) = 1.90,
MSe = 2.40. Means are presented in Table 13.
V

Discussion
There were two major findings o f interest in Experiment 4. The first concerns the
performance o f the participants in the ignore conditions. These participants exhibited
solution rates that were significantly higher than those o f the attend group, but not lower
than those o f the control group. This suggests that the fixation effects demonstrated in
Experiment 3 were not due exclusively to the presence o f the distracting information.
Rather, this study suggests that the distractors, coupled with the instructions to attend to
them, served to prevent participants from performing as well as the control group on the
RAT task.
This conclusion is supported by the results o f the recall task. In this task, attend
participants recalled significantly more o f the distractors than did the ignore participants.
This suggests that participants in the ignore group were somewhat successful in their
attempts to ignore the extraneous words, at least as indicated by their explicit memory for
these words. This finding raises an interesting question concerning the method by which
participants process the distracting stimuli. The knowledge that an extraneous stimulus

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
Table 11. Mean Improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2: Experiment 4.

Improvement

Group

Mean

SD

Attend
Ignore
Control

21.0
15.0
11.5

6.2
8.9
7.1
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Table 12. Mean Recall (Attend and Ignore Conditions): Experiment 4.

Recall

Group

M

SD

Attend
Ignore

38.7
20.9

17.2
11.2
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Table 13. Mean Improvement for High-, Medium-, and Low-Ability RAT solvers:
Experiment 4.

Improvement

Ability

M

SD

High
Medium
Low

2.96
4.33
3.33

1.6
2.1
1.5
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was not appropriate for solution was sufficient to diminish the effect o f that stimulus.
That is, participants were able to successfully ignore the information when they were
aware that the information would not be helpful to them. Therefore, Smith and
Blankenship's (1991) results, as well as the results o f Experiment 3 can be said to be partly
due to the instructions that participants were given; that is, to exploit the distractors to
find solutions to the RAT items.
This finding demonstrates a fundamental difference between Smith and
Blankenship's (1991) blocking procedure and what actually takes place when we find
ourselves unable to retrieve a known piece o f information. For example, when we
experience a TOT, the mere knowledge that the interloper that has been accessed is
incorrect does not make it possible to reduce the activation level o f that interloper (e.g.,
Jones, 1989; Jones & Langford, 1987).
The present finding can be compared to the results o f Experiments 1 and 2. In
those experiments, the fixating effects o f the incorrect riddle responses continued to exert
an effect on later solution attempts, both in the short-term (Experiment 1) and after an
incubation period (Experiment 2). In these riddles, the participants themselves generated
the incorrect responses. This is in contrast to the RAT example, in which the incorrect
responses were provided experimentally.
Also with respect to the topic o f incubation, the present experiment found no
differences in the degree to which participants o f varying ability levels benefited from the
incubation period to improve the number o f RATs solved on Trial 2. This is in contrast to
Experiment 3, in which the high-and medium-ability participants showed an advantage to
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the low-ability solvers in this regard. This might be accounted for in two ways. First, the
task performed in Experiment 4 was generally easier than that in Experiment 3, given that
the ignore participants were quite capable o f ignoring the distractors. Therefore, these
participants solved more RAT items on Trial 1. Subsequently, there was an overall
decrease in the amount o f improvement on RAT 2 for the ignore participants, compared to
those in the attend group. Second, there was a decrease in the difficulty level o f the RAT
rtems from Experiment 3 to Experiment 4. This also made the task easier. This is
especially important, in light o f research in social psychology demonstrating that positive
feedback can improve scores on the RAT (e.g., Fodor & Greenier, 1995), particularly for
individuals who have already been identified as having high ability for the task. Based on
this research, it might be the case that the low-ability participants in Experiment 3 became
discouraged by their poor performance on the RAT items, which might have served to
further diminish their performance.
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CHAPTER V

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present experiments were conducted to investigate several primary
hypotheses. The first o f these was the supposition that suppression efficiency is part o f a
general cognitive mechanism. Previous research by Gemsbacher and colleagues (e.g.,
Gemsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gemsbacher et al. 1990) has shown that suppression
efficiency is predictive o f comprehension ability. Further, they have demonstrated that this
suppression mechanism operates on nonlinguistic as well as linguistic tasks. Based on
their findings, these researchers predicted that suppression skill underlies a variety o f
cognitive abilities.
In Experiment 1, it was revealed that spontaneous transfer and informed transfer
abilities are related to suppression efficiency. This is significant because it extends the
previous work o f Gemsbacher and associates to the realm o f problem solving. Thus, it
supports the claim that suppression skill is a part o f cognitive abilities as a whole. Further,
Experiment 3 showed that ability on another problem solving task, the Remote Associates
Test, is also related to suppression skill. That these problem solving tasks are related is
not surprising, if both are considered as measures o f individuals' ability to draw
associations between sources o f information that do not seem to be immediately related.
For example, in order to solve the riddles in Experiment 1, participants had to recognize
104
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the relevance o f the previously-presented sentences. This was true in both the informed
and uninformed conditions. Similarly, the RAT measures the ability to draw associations
between words that are not obviously related to each other. That is, each o f the three
words in a RAT item is related to the two other words only through its connection to the
fourth, unpresented, word. Because three RAT words are not directly related to each
other in any way that is useful to solution, participants must disregard any immediate
connection that any given pair o f the words might share, and instead direct their search to
some remote word.
This process is very similar to what is involved in accessing the solution to the
riddles. For example, to solve the minister riddle, one must look beyond the obvious
meaning o f the word, "marry" and instead access the less common meaning o f this word.
Once this is accomplished, the solution to the riddle is clear. Each o f the riddles requires a
similar procedure to obtain solution. These results nicely complement Simonton's (1988)
conjecture that the ability to draw associations between remotely related concepts is
especially high in individuals who generate random permutations o f mental associations.
Because they randomly shift focus, these individuals do not perseverate on habitual
associations between concepts, thus allowing access to atypical connections between
words. Such an ability would certainly facilitate access to both the riddle and RAT
solutions. These accessing processes can also be compared to those that have previously
been shown to be related to suppression skill, such as solving a pun (Gemsbacher &
Robertson, 1995), or comprehending riddles (Fowles & d a n z , 1977; Yuill & Oakhill,
1991).
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In sum, the suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) proved to be
effective in distinguishing between partidpants who were high- or low- skilled problem
solvers. Thus, the present experiments have extended Gemsbacher et al's construct o f a
general suppression mechanism to the skill o f problem solving. Further, this finding adds
to previous research in problem solving that has investigated the differences between
individuals who vary in the ability to make use o f base analogs in studies o f analogical
transfer (Chen, 1995; Gick & Hoiyoak, 1980, 1983;Novick, 1988). Specifically, the
present findings suggest that skilled suppressors are able to make use o f the similarities
between the acquisition sentences and the riddles, although there was very little surface
overlap between the two sources o f information.
A second central theme o f the present dissertation was that o f the attenuation o f
fixation effects in problem solving. Results o f the riddle and RAT procedures yielded
differential results in this regard. While participants easily overcame their fixation to the
artificial blockers provided in the RAT procedures (Experiments 3 and 4), there was no
such recovery from fixation to the participant-generated solutions to the riddles in
Experiments 1 and 2. These findings are interpreted in light o f the generation effect
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978), which states that information that is generated by a participant
is better remembered than information that is experimentally provided to the participant.
This result can be contrasted with work in analogical transfer that has shown that
solution failures can actually improve performance on later-presented problems (e.g.,
Duncker, 1945; Gick & McGarry, 1992; Needham & Begg, 1991; Ross, 1984; Ross &
Kennedy, 1990). Needham and Begg (1991) showed that partidpants' failed attem pts to
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solve a base analog to the radiation problem resulted in higher solution rate to the
radiation problem, compared to participants who only read the base problem, but did not
attempt to solve it. Perfetto et al. (1987) showed the opposite effect using the insight
riddles. Participants who attempted to solve the riddles on an initial uninformed trial
performed less well on a subsequent informed trial than participants who simply read the
incorrect solutions in the uninformed trial. The present results are consistent with this
finding. It seems likely that participants1failure to solve "old" riddles in the informed
condition resulted from some combination o f having generated the incorrect responses
themselves, and a misguided perception that these solutions were the appropriate answers.
While this account effectively explains the results o f Experiment 1, the results o f
Experiment 2 are more elusive. Past research has shown that the introduction o f an
incubation period can serve to reduce the activation effect o f incorrect information and
thus, result in increased solution rates on problems such as the RAT (Patrick, 1986; Smith
& Blankenship, 1991) and anagrams (Goldman et al., 1992; Peterson, 1974), as well as on
reminiscence effects (Smith & Vela, 1991). Unlike initial incorrect responses in these
experiments, incorrect responses to the riddles were not alleviated during the incubation
period. It is possible that introducing a longer period between successive solution
attem pts might result in an incubation effect with the riddles. Previous research has
demonstrated that incubation effects are more dramatic after a 24-hour interval than after
a duration o f 20 minutes (e.g., Goldman et al., 1992). Further research might make use o f
this procedure to determine whether the fixation to self-generated solutions to the riddles
would be similarly decreased.
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A final issue regarding the riddles is whether the participants "caught on" to the
relevance o f the clue sentences at some point during the uninformed phase o f riddle
solution. Previous researchers have adhered to this account (e.g., Lockart et al., 1988;
Ross et al., 1989). Alternatively, others have suggested that participants do not "catch
on," but rather, they access the necessary information, but are not aware that this transfer
has taken place (Landrum, 1990; Maier, 1931; Perfetto et al., 1983). For example, Maier
presented participants with the two-string problem. As a clue to solution o f the problem,
he "accidentally” brushed by the rope, causing it to swing. Although solution rate to the
two-string problem increased after this hint, participants did not mention this incident
when describing how they came to their solution. To the contrary, participants most often
reported that the solution "just came to them." This result, which might be referred to as
the "insight" solution, was replicated by Landrum (1990).
In contrast, Ross et al. (1989), found convincing evidence for the "catching on"
position. They presented participants with the riddles previously used by Perfetto et al.
(1983). A majority o f participants reported that they became aware o f the relationship
between the riddles and the acquisition sentences during uninformed solution o f the
riddles. In a postexperimental questionnaire, Ross e t al. asked participants to specify the
riddle that they were working on when they made this realization. An analysis o f the
response rate on this trial showed that solution rates increased after this connection was
reported to have been made. That is, participants solved more riddles in the uninformed
condition after the first riddle in which they reported that they noticed the relevance o f the
sentences to the riddles.
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The present set o f experiments does not settle this dispute. However, it is likely
that the "bald" riddle did serve as a cue as to the relevance o f the sentences to the riddles.
A simple method o f testing this possibility in the future would be to provide only one
group o f uninformed participants with the bald riddle on Trial 1. I f this riddle served the
purpose stated above, the participants who receive the bald riddle on Trial 1 will show
greater increases in Trial 2 solution rate than participants who are not provided with this
cue.
In comparison to the outcome o f the riddle experiments, results o f Experiments 3
and 4 showed that fixation to experimentally-induced distractors is m ore easily overcome.
In Experiment 3, participants who initially attempted to solve the RAT items with the
distractors present experienced difficulty in solving, in comparison to control participants
who had no distractors. However, solution rate for fixated participants increased
substantially on RAT 2 when no distractors were present, although these participants did
not increase to the level o f control participants on RAT 2. This result was replicated in
Experiment 4 for the "attend" participants.
Experiment 4 more closely examined the process by which the distractors exerted
their effects in Experiment 3. Comparison between the attend and ignore participants on
RAT 1 revealed that the ignore participants solved significantly more RAT items than did
the attend participants. This suggests that the detrimental effects o f the distractors in
Experiment 3 were due in large part to the instructions that participants attended to the
distractors because they thought they would be helpful to solution. W hen told to ignore
these distractors in Experiment 4, participants were able to do so. This draws a distinction
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between the usual effects o f distracting information in everyday problem solving and the
somewhat contrived distractors used here. In normal problem solving, such as when a
TOT state occurs, fixation to a distracting stimulus is not so easily overcome. Attempting
to disregard an incorrect word often serves to strengthen the fixating effect o f that word.
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that "attend" groups in Experiments 3 and 4 experienced
fixation to the distractors, and that this fixation was mitigated by the introduction o f an
incubation period.
Results o f the relative effectiveness o f an incubation period for individuals o f
varying ability levels were inconclusive. Experiment 3 showed greater incubation effects
for the high-skilled problem solvers, replicating Patrick's (1986) findings, but contrasting
with Smith and Blankenship's (1991) results. Experiment 4 revealed no differences in the
incubation effect for participants o f varying RAT solution abilities. Although this result is
disappointing, it is not out of step with previous incubation research, some o f which has
shown benefits to high-ability problem solvers (Patrick, 1986; Smith & Blankenship, 1991,
Experiment 5), and other work that has shown that poor problem solvers benefit more
from incubation periods (Murray & Denny, 1969; Smith & Blankenship, 1991, Experiment

I).
This controversy is only fueled by the present findings. It is possible to conjecture
as to the basis for the differential incubation results in Experiments 3 and 4. It is possible
that the incubation period did not prove as helpful in Experiment 4 because the
participants were able to successfully ignore the distractors on RAT 1. Therefore,
solution rates on RAT 1 were not hindered by the presence o f the distractors to the degree
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that RAT 1 solutions were depressed in Experiment 3. Such a process would render the
incubation period less useful because participants solved more problems on RAT 1.
Comparison o f the RAT 1 solution rates between Experiments 3 and 4 supports this
possibility.
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Conclusions
The present experimental materials examined one o f the oldest issues in cognitive
research, that o f the influence o f past experience on problem solving performance. The
relative effect o f a domain o f knowledge has intrigued investigators since Thorndike
(1898) placed cats in his puzzle box. The present experiments made use o f materials that
were certainly within the domain o f knowledge o f participants, given that all participants
are aware o f the solutions to the insight riddles, as well as to the common phrases formed
in the RAT items. Thus, performance is not dependent solely on possession o f such
knowledge, but is also greatly affected by diverse factors, such as the ability to access that
information when necessary, the ability to ignore irrelevant information, and skill in
suppressing inappropriate word meanings.
Further, these experiments showed that fixation effects can be attenuated under
certain circumstances, but that these effects can be quite enduring in other instances.
These differential findings seem to be resultant o f the type o f problems that are presented,
as well as the method by which blocking is induced. Specifically, it was shown that
fixation to superficial distractors can be effectively overcome, in that such distractors were
easily ignored. However, distractors that are generated by the participants are more
difficult to surmount. In fact, the procedures used in these experiments did not result in
attenuation o f these fixation effects. Further research might investigate more effective
methods to achieve this end.
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APPENDIX A

Riddles and corresponding clue sentences from Experiments 1 and 2

The first three riddles are the filler materials. The fourth is the "bald" riddle that
was used to demonstrate the relationship between the sentences and the riddles.
Therefore, these four riddles w ere not included in the analyses reported in this dissertation.
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Dan comes home from work and finds Charlie dead on the floor. On the floor is
some broken glass and some water. Dan takes one look around and immediately knows
how Charlie died. How did he die?
Charlie was a fish.

A criminal took his wife to a movie theater that was showing a shoot-em-up
western. During one scene, when many guns were fired, he murdered his wife by shooting
her in the head. He then took his wife's body out o f the theater, but no one stopped him.
How did he manage it?
It was a drive-in movie.

Two train tracks run parallel except for a spot where they go under a tunnel. The
tunnel is not wide enough to accommodate both tracks, so they become a single track for
the distance o f the tunnel. One afternoon a train entered going one direction, and another
train entered the same tunnel going the opposite direction. Both trains were going at top
speed, yet there was no collision. Explain.
The trains entered at different times.

A man was caught in the rain with no hat or umbrella. There was nothing over his
head and his clothes got soaked, but not a hair on his head got wet. How is this possible?
A bald man does not have to dry his hair after taking a shower.

A man who lived in a small town in the U. S. married twenty different women o f
the same town. All are still living and he has never divorced any o f them. Yet he has
broken no law. Can you explain?
A minister marries several people each week.
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Whenever my aunt comes to visit me at my apartment, she always gets o ff the
elevator five floors beneath my floor. She then walks up the stairway to my apartment.
Can you tell me why?
The top buttons on an elevator are too high for a midget to reach.

A wine bottle is half-filled and corked. How can you drink all o f the wine without
removing the cork from the bottle?
A cork can be opened by pulling it out or pushing it in.

Can you make a tennis ball go a short distance, come to a dead stop, then reverse
itself and go in the opposite direction? Note: Bouncing the ball is not permitted, nor can
you hit it with anything, nor tie it to anything
If you throw a ball into the air, it comes back down.

The Great Sol Loony announced that on a certain day, at a certain time, he would
perform a great miracle. He would walk for twenty minutes on the surface o f the Hudson
River without sinking into the water. A big crowd gathered to witness the event. The
Reverend Sol Loony did exactly what he said he would do. How did he manage to walk
on the surface o f the river without sinking?
A person walking on frozen water will not fall through.

If you had only one match and you wanted to light a kerosene lamp, an oil heater,
or a wood burning stove, which would you light first?
You must first light a match before you can light a fire.
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Why are 1987 dollar bills w orth more than 1986 dollar bills?
1,850 dollar bills are worth more than 1,849 dollar bills.

One night my uncle was reading an exciting book when his wife turned out the
light. Even though the room was pitch dark, he continued to read. How could he do
that?
A blind person can read Braille in the dark.

Uriah Fuller, the famous superpsychic, can tell you the score o f any baseball game
before the game starts. W hat is his secret?
Before any game is played, there is no score.

This morning, one o f my earrings fell into my coffee. Even though my cup was
full, the earring didn't get wet. How come?
You add hot w ater to ground beans to make coffee.
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APPENDIX B

RAT items from Experiment 3

RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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Problems

Solutions

1. LICK
tongue

SPRINKLE
rain

MINES
gold

salt

2. WIDOW
woman

BITE
chew

MONKEY
wrench

spider

3. TYPE
style

GHOST
goblin

STORY
tale

w riter

4. SURPRISE
trick

LINE
angle

BIRTHDAY
cake

party

5. WHEEL
tire

ELECTRIC
cord

HIGH
low

chair

6. CAT
nap

SLEEP
might

BOARD
wood

walk

7. SHIP
ocean

OUTER
inner

CRAWL
floor

space

8. BALL
soccer

STORM
tornado

MAN
boy

snow

9. FAMILY
mother

APPLE
pie

HOUSE
home

tree

10. ATTORNEY
lawyer

SELF
me

SPENDING
shopping

defense

11. WORM
bug

SCOTCH
whiskey

RED
green

tape

12. WATER
bath

PICK
choose

SKATE
board

ice
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13. RIVER
lake

NOTE
music

BLOOD
wound

bank

14. FOOD
eat

CATCHER
pitcher

HOT
cold

dog

15. HEARTED
broken

FEET
inches

BITTER
sweet

cold

16. SANDWICH
jelly

GOLF
course

CANADIAN
Montreal

dnb

17. GRAVY
potato

SHOW
movie

TUG
pull

boat

18. ARM
leg

COAL
furnace

PEACH
pear

p it
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APPENDIX C .l

RAT items from Experiment 4, helpful conditions

RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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Problems

Solutions

1. LICK
tongue

SPRINKLE
rain

MINES
gold

salt

2. TYPE
style

GHOST
goblin

STORY
tale

writer

3. SURPRISE
trick

LINE
angle

BIRTHDAY
cake

party

4. WHEEL
tire

ELECTRIC
cord

HIGH
low

chair

5. CAT
nap

SLEEP
might

BOARD
wood

walk

6. BALL
soccer

STORM
tornado

MAN
boy

snow

7. WORM
bug

SCOTCH
whiskey

RED
green

tape

8. FOOD
eat

CATCHER
pitcher

HOT
cold

dog

9. HEARTED
broken

FEET
inches

BITTER
sweet

cold

10. SANDWICH
jelly

GOLF
course

CANADIAN
Montreal

club

11. GRAVY
potato

SHOW
movie

TUG
pull

boat

12. ARM
leg

COAL
furnace

PEACH
pear

Pit
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13. PASTE
glue

BUCK
deer

FAIRY
pixie

tooth

14. FINGER
hand

OIL
olive

BRUSH
comb

paint

15. FLAG
banner

NORTH
south

VAULT
tomb

pole

16. WIDOW
black

BITE
chew

MONKEY
wrench

spider

17. CRAWL
storage

OUTER
floor

SHIP
ocean

space

18. APPLE
branch

HOUSE
home

FAMILY
mother

tree

19 SKATE
blade

PICK
choose

WATER
bath

ice

20. RIVER
edge

NOTE
music

BLOOD
wound

bank
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APPENDIX C.2

RAT items from Experiment 4, distracting conditions

RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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Problems

Solutions

1. LICK
tongue

SPRINKLE
rain

MINES
gold

salt

2. TYPE
style

GHOST
goblin

STORY
tale

w riter

3. SURPRISE
trick

LINE
angle

BIRTHDAY
cake

party

4. WHEEL
tire

ELECTRIC
cord

HIGH
low

chair

5. CAT
nap

SLEEP
might

BOARD
wood

walk

6. BALL
soccer

STORM
tornado

MAN
boy

snow

7. WORM
bug

SCOTCH
whiskey

RED
green

tape

8. FOOD
eat

CATCHER
pitcher

HOT
cold

dog

9. HEARTED
broken

FEET
inches

BITTER
sweet

cold

10. SANDWICH
jelly

GOLF
course

CANADIAN
Montreal

club

11. GRAVY
potato

SHOW
movie

TUG
pull

boat

12. ARM
leg

COAL
furnace

PEACH
pear

pit
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13. PASTE
glue

BUCK
deer

FAIRY
pixie

tooth

14. FINGER
hand

OIL
olive

BRUSH
comb

paint

15. FLAG
banner

NORTH
south

VAULT
tomb

pole

16. WIDOW
woman

BITE
chew

MONKEY
wrench

spider

17. CRAWL
floor

OUTER
floor

SHIP
ocean

space

18. APPLE
pie

HOUSE
home

FAMILY
mother

tree

19 SKATE
board

PICK
choose

WATER
bath

ice

20. RIVER
lake

NOTE
music

BLOOD
wound

bank
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